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I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy trustees hate liens and would like to destroy them.
If they succeed, the general creditors will be enriched (and the
trustee's fees will be increased). Let us suppose, however, that a
trustee has done everything in her power to destroy a secured party's
lien, but has been unable to do it. Given that the secured and
unsecured creditors now have to live with each other,' the trustee's
second-best strategy is to steal as much value from the secured credi-
1. This is not to say that the trustee is entitled to hold a secured party's collateral
arbitrarily. Even if the trustee supplies adequate protection to a secured party, the trustee
must abandon the collateral to the secured party, unless (a) the debtor has equity in the
collateral, 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), or (b) even if the debtor does not
have equity, the collateral is necessary to an effective debtor reorganization, id. § 362(d)(2)(B),
or (c) the trustee claims the secured party's liens are voidable. First State Bank of Crossett
Arkansas v. W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc. (In re W.E. Tucker Oil, Inc.), 42 Bankr. 897, 903 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1984). If none of these conditions is true, the secured party is entitled to have the
automatic stay lifted. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). But see In re Missimer, 44
Bankr. 219, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (court claimed discretion to keep stay in effect, even
though there was no reorganization and no equity, provided debtor met scheduled mortgage
payments). If the debtor has equity in the collateral, the trustee may retain the collateral on the
theory that the bankruptcy trustee will maximize the value of the equity for the benefit of the
general creditors. In contrast, a profit-maximizing secured party will cease to maximize value
when she recovers her own claim. If the trustee retains the collateral in order to maximize the
debtor equity, then the interest of the secured party is maximized automatically when the
interests of the general creditors are maximized. See Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of
Liens on After-Acquired Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 532-33 (1985).
For burdens of proof under Section 362, see In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 Bankr. 852,
858-60 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 177, 226-27 (1978) [hereinafter Kennedy, Stay Under Old Act]; Miller, The
Automatic Stay in Chapter XI Cases-A Catalyst for Rehabilitation or an Abuse of Creditors'
Rights?, 94 BANKING L.J. 676, 702-16 (1977) [hereinafter Miller, The Stay in Chapter XI]. For
a discussion of the meaning of "necessary to an effective reorganization," see In re Planned
Systems, Inc., 78 Bankr. at 864-66; In re Belton Inns, Inc., 71 Bankr. 811, 817-18 (Bankr. S.D.
Iowa 1987). Generally, such questions will not be addressed in this Article.
Assuming that the trustee can retain the collateral for one of the above reasons, the
trustee must supply adequate protection-entitlements that assure a secured party's claim will
not be prejudiced over the life of the bankruptcy. If the trustee fails to do this, the secured
party is entitled to have the stay lifted for cause. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
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tors as possible.2 Standing in the way of the trustee, however, is the
rule that the trustee must give "adequate protection" to any security
interest. a
The idea of adequate protection, however, presupposes a knowl-
edge of the property right .to be protected. One of the most difficult
issues in bankruptcy is whether the security interest to be protected
includes the right to "postpetition interest"- interest that accrues
after the bankruptcy petition is filed and before the proceeding is ter-
minated by liquidation or confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. In a
variety of ways, adequate protection is intricately tied up with this
question of "postpetition interest." There are several issues. First,
should undersecured parties-secured parties whose total claim has a
higher face value than the value of the collateral-receive postpetition
interest to which general creditors are not entitled?4 Or should under-
secured parties receive postpetition interest because oversecured par-
ties receive it?5 Or should we ignore such analogies and instead
choose a rule on instrumental grounds of public policy? Second, with
regard to oversecured parties, should the debtor's equity in the collat-
eral serve as a limit on how much interest an oversecured party can
get? Or should an oversecured party receive regular interest beyond
the amount of debtor equity, so long as at least some debtor equity
exists when the bankruptcy commences.
The task of describing the entitlement to postpetition interest has
2. I am assuming that the trustee is performing her fiduciary duties in order to maximize
the bankrupt estate for the general. creditors. The trustee therefore is portrayed as wanting to
steal from the secured creditors in order to benefit the general creditors. If the trustee is purely
self-interested, she will want to steal for herself, and both the secured and unsecured creditors
will be her victims. See infra text accompanying note 262.
It might be also added that when the trustee is the "debtor in possession" (DIP)- and
this will very commonly be the case at the start of a proceeding in a business bankruptcy-the
secured party might have a strong bargaining position against DIP speculations if the secured
party is the most likely supplier of future capital infusions.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (Supp. IV 1986). Even security interests that are challenged as
voidable preferences must be adequately protected, pending the outcome of the challenge. See
Greives v. Bank of Western Indiana, (In re Greives), 81 Bankr. 912, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1987); Hoyt, Inc. v. Born, (In re Born), 10 Bankr. 43, 47 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981). In addition,
the trustee must devise the plan for adequate protection, not the court. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
American AgCredit Corp., (In re Blehm Land & Cattle Co.) 859 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir.
1988). Adequate protection plans, however, require court approval, unless the secured party
assents. Id.
4. Section 502(b) states that a general creditor is allowed only "the amount of [a] claim
... as of the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition." 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (Supp. IV
1986). Section 502(b)(2) also bars claims for unmatured interest. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986). The combination of these ideas means general creditors do not receive
postpetition interest. But see 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (Supp. III 1985) (After all other claims are
paid, general creditors may get postpetition interest, but only at the mediocre "legal rate.").
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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been complicated recently by the Supreme Court in United Savings
Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates.6 In Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest, the Supreme Court held that a security interest
belonging to an undersecured party does not include postpetition
interest; therefore "adequate protection" does not include the protec-
tion of this right.7 It remains true, however, that oversecured parties
remain entitled to postpetition interest. But as postpetition interest
accrues all oversecured parties will become undersecured parties, if
the bankruptcy proceeding lasts long enough. The problem is that the
principal device that protects secured parties-the excess value in the
collateral beyond the amount of the secured claim-also serves as the
measure for the amount of postpetition interest an oversecured party
can get.
This Article explores both the doctrinal and ethical complexities
of the collision between postpetition interest entitlements and the ade-
quate protection doctrine. Section II of this Article commences with a
brief look at "adequate protection" under the old Bankruptcy Act9
and the new Bankruptcy Code.'0 Section III examines postpetition
interest both under the 1898 Act" and under the new Bankruptcy
Code. As it turns out, the Bankruptcy Code is profoundly unable to
determine whether undersecured parties should receive postpetition
interest as part of adequate protection.' 2  Section III also examines
6. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
7. Id. at 635.
8. See I I U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
9. Ch. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (supplemented in 1938 by the Chandler Act, ch. 575,
§ 1, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)). It is collectively referred to as the Bankruptcy Act.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as Title 11 of U.S.C. (1982)).
11. Ch. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
12. The commentators are vociferous that Section 361, 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), has a clear meaning with regard to postpetition interest, but they disagree as to what
that meaning is. Compare O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251, 262 (1982) ("close attention to section 361 and related
provisions can leave little doubt that no such protection is contemplated by the Code") with
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.),
734 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating the opposite is the "plain meaning" of the
Bankruptcy Code); see also Note, "Adequate Protection" and the Availability of Postpetition
Interest to Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1115 (1987) ("The
words of the Bankruptcy Code by themselves compel no answer to the issue of postpetition
interest; the legislative history of the sections dealing with adequate protection provides only
incoherent and unhelpful guidance.").
If there is one person who should know what is intended by the Bankruptcy Code, it is the
man who co-wrote it: Kenneth Klee, a former counsel to the House Judiciary Committee.
Klee recently has declared that Congress intended that undersecured creditors get no
postpetition interest. Klee & Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of Judicial
Legislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 29-36 (1988). In an unguarded moment, however, Klee
admits, "the issue was never raised." Id. at 34. Therefore, even assuming that congressional
[Vol. 43:577
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the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Timbers of Inwood Forest
which takes a strong position against a postpetition interest entitle-
ment.13 An examination of this opinion will show the Supreme Court
to be unpersuasive in its statutory analysis.
Since Timbers of Inwood Forest does not clearly preclude postpe-
tition interest as a matter of judicial discretion, 4 Sections IV and V
look at the efficiency and fairness of postpetition interest entitlements
for undersecured creditors. By way of preview, I will show that the
efficiency argument has no good empirical basis and is therefore not
credible. The fairness arguments tend to fail because they assert that
undersecured creditors deserve to be compensated for their loss, with-
out explaining why unsecured creditors do not deserve the same treat-
ment. Section VI examines oversecured creditors and the postpetition
interest entitlement. Finally, Section VII asks whether regulation
against postpetition interest is even possible, or whether the cleverness
of lawyers will always be one step ahead of such regulative efforts.
We commence with a look at the historical origins of adequate
protection.
II. ADEQUATE PROTECTION
A. Under the 1898 Act
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, courts could stay the
enforcement of security interests. 5 The Bankruptcy Act contained
intent and Klee's intent are the same thing, it would appear that the question is not determined
by the words of the Bankruptcy Code.
13. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
14. Id. at 635. Nothing in the opinion clearly precludes postpetition interest in every case.
Nevertheless, it has proved tempting to read the Supreme Court's opinion as ruling that
undersecured parties should never get postpetition interest. See Cimarron Investors v. Wyid
Properties (In re Cimarron Investors), 848 F.2d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1988) ("considerations
based on alleged fairness and equity are not relevant when the statute, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, bars [such an] interpretation"); Fairfax Savings v. Sherwood Square Assocs.
(In re Sherwood Square Assocs.), 87 Bankr. 388, 391-92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (past
postpetition interest actually paid but now deemed improper was deemed to have reduced the
secured claim pro tanto); Schorer, The Right of the Undersecured Creditor to Postpetition
Interest in Bankruptcy on the Value of Its Collateral: Implications of Recent Cases, 21 U.C.C.
L.J. 61, 62 (1988).
15. Ch. 541, Sec. 11, 30 Stat. 549 (1898). For a description of the power of bankruptcy
courts to stay lien enforcement under the 1898 Act, see Countryman, Real Estate Liens in
Business Rehabilitation Cases, 50 Am. BANKR. L.J. 303, 304 (1976); Kennedy, Automatic Stays
Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3 (1978) [hereinafter Kennedy, Stay
Under New Law]; Kennedy, Stay Under Old Act, supra note 1, at 177; Miller, The Stay in
Chapter XI, supra note 1, at 676; Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint: Relief
from the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1216, 1217-19 (1977);
Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and
Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15 (1974); Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business
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no requirement of adequate protection during the pendency of this
injunctive restraint. A secured party in a liquidation could ask that
the stay be lifted if the debtor had no equity in the collateral. But if
the stay was not lifted, then no provision was made for adequate pro-
tection of the secured party's position. The secured party simply took
her chances and hoped to collect from the cash proceeds. If the pro-
ceeds were insufficient to cover the senior sales expense of the trustee
and the secured party's claim, that was just too bad for the secured
party.
In reorganization cases, the Chandler Act 6 provided secured
parties with adequate protection, but adequate protection meant
something very different from the modem meaning. Today, adequate
protection means protecting the value of a secured claim during the
time the automatic stay is in effect" 7 -that is, the time between the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and the confirmation of the plan (or
Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63
CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1486-95 (1975); Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate
Reorganization and the Secured Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 509,
518-20 (1975). If you only have time to read one of these articles, choose Kennedy's first
article. Kennedy, Stay Under Old Act, supra note 1. It is both accessible and encyclopedic in
scope.
The situation may be summarized as follows. In the case of a straight liquidation, a
bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over property that the secured party had already
repossessed. Foreclosures and repossessions already commenced by the .time of the
bankruptcy petition was filed could continue without interference. Straton v. New, 283 U.S.
318, 320-21 (1931). If foreclosure or repossession had not commenced, however, the property
is within the jurisdiction of a federal court, Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Lumber Co., 282 U.S. 734
(1931), and Former Bankruptcy Rule 601 stayed the commencement of any foreclosure
proceeding. The stay might have been lifted, however, if the debtor has no equity in the
property. Knapp v. Seligson (In re Ira Haupt & Co.), 398 F.2d 607, 612-13 (2d Cir. 1968).
In reorganization, the Bankruptcy Act contained three different chapters. Chapter X
provided for the appointment of a mandatory trustee if liquidated debts exceeded $250,000.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938). This feature distressed corporate
management, but this chapter allowed for altering the rights of secured parties, provided the
secured parties received equivalent values. Id. at § 212, 52 Stat. 895. Chapter XI provided for
the possibility of a debtor-in-possession (DIP), and therefore corporate management favored it.
Chapter XI could not, however, affect any of the rights of a secured party. Id. at § 342, 52
Stat. 909. When a Chapter XI plan was confirmed, the stay was lifted and the secured parties
were free to have it. Id. at § 367(4), 52 Stat. 912. Chapter XII covered noncorporate
reorganizations in which the debt was primarily secured by real estate; it provided for DIPs
and could affect the rights of mortgagees. Id. at § 444, 52 Stat. 920.
Originally, automatic stays were only in Chapters X and XII, but lawyers routinely asked
for and obtained nonautomatic stays. Id. at § 112, 52 Stat. 884 (Chapter X); id. at § 414, 52
Stat. 917-18 (Chapter XII). By the mid-1970's, ongoing lien enforcement actions were
automatically stayed in each of the Chapters, even after repossession.
16. Ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (1938). The original Bankruptcy Act contained no
reorganization provisions. Instead, reorganizations were accomplished under equity
receiverships. After 1933, legislation was enacted to cover reorganization, and in 1938,
Congress passed the Chandler Act to make reorganization proceedings more effective. See id.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
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liquidation sale). After the plan is confirmed or the liquidation sale18
is complete, the automatic stay lapses. Adequate protection is irrele-
vant to the post-plan or post-sale time period.19
Under the Chandler Act, adequate protection meant just the
opposite. The phrase had no relevance to the time between the peti-
tion and the confirmation of a plan or liquidation sale. Adequate pro-
tection instead referred to what dissenting secured parties were
entitled to in a reorganization plan. In other words, the plan itself
had to protect the secured claim adequately.20 Adequate protection
therefore was shorthand for an equivalent exchange between a
secured party's nonbankruptcy rights and the rights to be given under
the reorganization plan.
Before the plan was confirmed, enforcement of all security inter-
ests was stayed, but the reorganization provisions of the old Bank-
ruptcy Act did not provide any express adequate protection of
secured parties. 21 Nevertheless, secured parties frequently asked for
relief from these stays on the ground that they would cause undue
harm to the secured parties. The requirement of undue harm as cause
to lift the stay was created by case law2 2 out of the old equitable doc-
trine that preliminary injunctions should not issue unless, first, the
plaintiff would probably succeed on the merits, and, second, the
defendant would not be unduly harmed.2 a
Pursuant to this standard, reorganization courts developed the
18. The sale might or might not be made free and clear of liens. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (1982
& Supp. IV 1986). In either case, the automatic stay no longer stops enforcement of a security
interest. If the sale is made free of liens, however, the lien on the collateral no longer exists; it
is deemed transferred to the cash proceeds received by the trustee in the sale.
19. In re Johnson, 63 Bankr. 550, 553 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (Chapter 13).
20. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 216(7), 52 Stat. 896 (1938). This Section required the
plan:
[to] provide for any class of creditors which is affected by and does not accept the
plan by the two-thirds majority in amount required under this chapter, adequate
protection for the realization by them of the value of their claims against the
property dealt with by the plan.
Id.
21. An exception of a sort existed for rolling stock, airplanes and ships, Bankruptcy Act
§§ 770), 116(5) & (6), and for mortgages insured under the National Housing Act mortgages.
Id. §§ 263, 517. These provisions saved such security interests from automatic stays
altogether.
In the Bankruptcy Code, ships, planes and rolling stock are immune from the automatic
stay only if the trustee, with court approval, agrees to perform all obligations under the
security agreement. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1110(a), 1168(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
22. See In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 545 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1976); In re
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Caplan
v. Anderson, 256 F.2d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703,
707 (2d Cir. 1952).
23. See Kennedy, Stay Under Old Act, supra note 1, at 239-40 (rehabilitation proceedings
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custom of conditioning the continuance of the injunction on protec-
tion of the secured party's position. When protection of this sort was
not provided, and when the bankruptcy proceeding harmed the posi-
tion of the secured party, courts sometimes insisted that the reorgani-
zation plan give the secured party who was harmed a value based on
what would have been realized if there had been no bankruptcy.24
When no plan was confirmed, it was not clear what should happen in
the ensuing liquidation, but an argument could have been made that
depreciation expense constituted an administrative expense, for which
secured parties could get a high priority.25
B. Under the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code expressly provides for adequate protection
of security interests, so long as the automatic stay in bankruptcy pre-
vents them from being enforced pursuant to state law. This express
statutory provision for adequate protection stems from two beliefs
held by Congress' legal staff. First, the lawyers for both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees believed that adequate protection
was constitutionally required.26 Second, they believed that adequate
protection ought to preserve the benefit of the secured parties' bar-
only allowed if court ruled that rehabilitation was likely); see also id. at 253 (cases balance
benefit to debtor versus harm to creditor).
24. In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 147 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, Commonwealth of Mass. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 325 U.S. 884
(1945).
25. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Congress in
the 1970's, invented modem adequate protection. It read Freuhauf Corp. v. Yale Express
System, Inc. (In re Yale Express System, Inc.), 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967), as requiring or at
least authorizing this administrative priority if all other forms of collateral failed during the
reorganization proceeding. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 236-37 (1973). This
assumption comes from an elliptical remark in Yale Express stating that, if the secured party
"has been damaged by the use of its property pending the reorganization, it is entitled to
equitable consideration in the reorganization plan." 384 F.2d at 992. See United Say. Ass'n.
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793
F.2d 1380, 1391 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988) (reading Yale Express as authorizing only administrative priority for any failed
adequate protection).
The proposal that mere administrative priority in a liquidation serves as adequate
protection has now been expressly forbidden in Bankruptcy Code Section 361(3). 11 U.S.C.
§ 361(3) (1982). Section 361(3) is said to be a purposeful rejection of the holding of Yale
Express. See Note, Compensation for Time Value as Part of Adequate Protection During the
Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 312-13 (1983) [hereinafter Chicago
Note].
26. "Perhaps more by dint of repetition than by analysis," comments the leading expert on
this question. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 973, 977 (1983).
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gain. The first of these reasons is all but completely wrong, and the
second is certainly a perplexing argument to use in bankruptcy legis-
lation, where the obliteration of bargains is everywhere observed. We
pause briefly to examine these two premises.
1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ADEQUATE PROTECTION
The argument that the United States Constitution mandates ade-
quate protection must be largely, and perhaps totally, rejected. At a
minimum, the constitutional argument confuses the difference
between prospective and retrospective legislation." There is little
doubt that Congress can adversely affect security interests prospec-
tively, even to the point of banning them altogether. When Congress
acts prospectively, bankruptcy legislation helps to constitute the very
property interest that a secured party might later claim Congress has
taken away. 28 For example, Congress (prospectively) banned nonpur-
chase money security interests on certain exempt consumer goods.29
Thereafter, security interests became, by definition, property interests
27. "It seems to be thought that fifth amendment principles . . . impose generally
applicable limits on the substantive scope of bankruptcy power of a sort that would apply even
to purely prospective bankruptcy legislation." Id. at 984. For authorities taking this mistaken
position, see In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Planned
Systems, Inc., 78 Bankr. 852, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); Anderson, Partially Secured
Creditors: Their Rights and Remedies Under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 37 LA. L.
REV. 1003, 1005 (1977); Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 525; Comment, The Secured Creditor's
Right to Full Liquidation Value in Corporate Reorganization, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 510, 514-15
(1975) [hereinafter Chicago Comment].
28. See Household Finance Corp. v. Carrol (In re Carrol), 11 Bankr. 45, 47 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981). Professor Rogers writes:
What, one may ask, has been "taken" from the secured creditor? At the time he
entered into the security arrangement, he knew or should have known that his
rights were circumscribed by the federal legislation. If his property rights are
defined by reference to existing law, obviously no taking has occurred. Thus, the
proposition that the fifth amendment imposes limitations on even purely
prospective restrictions of the rights of secured creditors seems to assume that
the property rights held by secured creditors are in some sense anterior to
positive law. The implications of that concept are staggering.
Rogers, supra note 26, at 987. This answer begs a very important question, as Rogers recog-
nizes. If no "takings" issue is ever raised by prospective legislation because that legislation
becomes part of the definition of property, then perhaps Congress can repeal the takings clause
altogether by passing a law stating that uncompensated forfeitures are part and parcel of all
property concepts. Id. at 987 n.59. Unless one views this as possible, one is bound to the
notion that property is, to some extent, anterior to positive law.
Rogers' own answer to the possibility of repealing the fifth amendment in this way is to
state that (a) most takings involve real estate, and (b) they do not make real estate anymore.
That is, such a law would obligate Congress to compensate every existing landowner in the
country, and therefore we have nothing to worry about.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. III 1985). This provision does not state whether it is
retrospective or not, but the Supreme Court assumed that Congress never could have intended
to test the constitutionality of retrospective bankruptcy legislation and so chose to interpret
1989]
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that could not encumber certain consumer goods, at least so far as
bankruptcy courts were concerned. This disability cannot (prospec-
tively) be called a "taking." It is simply an inherent flaw in the prop-
erty interest itself. If Congress therefore can (prospectively) prohibit
security interests altogether, it can (prospectively) deny them ade-
quate protection. Surely the power to destroy includes the power to
tax.
This much should be self-evident. It is also possible, however, to
make a powerful argument that Congress never needed to provide
adequate protection even for security interests created before the
Bankruptcy Code was enacted. In other words, adequate protection
could have been denied retroactively as well as prospectively.
Retroactive denial of adequate protection would have been per-
missible, because secured parties never had that right prior to 1978.
We have seen how, prior to 1978, secured parties were subject to stays
of foreclosure and how they sought relief from the stay when they
were unduly harmed by it. Although courts were urged to give this
relief as a matter of discretion, the Supreme Court emphasized several
times and even demonstrated that adequate protection was not a legal
right that required constitutional protection under the fifth amend-
ment. In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pacific Railway,30 the Supreme Court stated: "A claim
that injurious consequences will result to the pledgee or the mortga-
gee may not, of course, be disregarded by the district court; but it
presents a question addressed not to the power of the court but to its
discretion . 1,aI The Court used this discretion to the sorrow of
junior secured parties in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railway Co.3 2 In Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
the Supreme Court permitted the accrual of senior secured interest to
squeeze out the junior secured creditors, so that, by the end of the
proceeding, the juniors had lost 90% of principal. 33 No fifth amend-
ment impediment stood in the way.34
Similarly, in the New Haven Inclusion Cases,a5 the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) conditioned a merger between Penn
section 522(f) as intended only for prospective application. United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1982).
30. 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
31. Id. at 677 (emphasis added); see also In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 545 F.2d
1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 1976) (denying the constitutional status of adequate protection).
32. 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
33. Id. at 533.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 238-46.
35. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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Central and the New York Central Railway Co. on Penn Central's
purchase of the encumbered assets of the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railway Co.36 The ICC forced Penn Central to assume con-
trol of the unwanted New Haven line, even before a price could be
worked out, on the understanding that the assets would be valued
later by the ICC, as approved by the reorganization court.3 7
Although the New Haven line had been in reorganization since 1961,
the liquidation value of the assets was set as of 1966.38 In the interim,
the value of the collateral had deteriorated to the prejudice of the
undersecured creditors.39 In particular, super-priority liens were
granted to various suppliers, pursuant to the rules of railroad reorgan-
ization. 0 The secured parties insisted that the 1961 liquidation value
be used (or, as the Court put it, that the secured parties be reimbursed
for the super-priority liens that eroded their collateral). 1
The Supreme Court affirmed the use of 1966 values, even though
this meant that the secured parties received no adequate protection
between the years 1961 and 1966.42 The secured creditors claimed this
was a fifth amendment taking.43 The Supreme Court disagreed,
stating:
We do not doubt that the time consumed in the course of the pro-
ceedings in the reorganization court has imposed a substantial loss
upon the [secured creditors]. But in the circumstances presented
by this litigation we see no constitutional bar to that result. The
rights of the bondholders are not absolute.... [S]ecurity holders
"cannot be called upon to sacrifice their property so that a depres-
sion-proof railroad system might be created. But they invested
their capital in a public utility that does owe an obligation to the
public.... [B]y their entry into a railroad enterprise, [the secured
creditors] assumed the risk that in any depression or any reorgani-
zation the interests of the public would be considered as well as
theirs.""
36. Id. at 392.
37. Id. at 409.
38. Id. at 411-12.
39. Id. at 399-407.
40. Id. at 491-92.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 491 ("we see no constitutional bar to that result").
43. Id. at 492.
44. Id. at 491.92 (citations omitted). This quote could be taken as establishing a "public
interest" doctrine-i.e., if the security interest encumbers property that has important public
implications, the government may erode these liens without having to compensate the losers.
See Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTiCE OF LAW 154-55 (1988). The Supreme Court specifically
rejected this suggestion in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.,
328 U.S. 495, 535 (1945), which permitted the deterioration of junior security interests, while
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This case raises doubt as to whether secured parties ever had a
right to adequate protection. Rather, adequate protection was solely
a matter of judicial discretion. As a result, not only could Congress
have denied adequate protection prospectively in 1978, but Congress
could have denied adequate protection retrospectively to security inter-
ests created before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.15
The congressional drafting staff therefore erred in asserting that the
Constitution required any form of adequate protection. 6
specifically disavowing any reliance on a public interest doctrine. The fifth amendment was
designed quite specifically to force compensation for property taken in the public interest. It
would be shocking if "public interest" would become an excuse for not paying compensation.
45. Incidentally, even if putting the expenses of operating the railroad on the secured
parties had been considered a fifth amendment taking, it does not follow that this should affect
the price that Penn Central was obliged to pay for the assets. Rather, it could have resulted in
government liability under the Tucker Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 132-33 (1974); See Countryman, supra note 15, at 339 (1976); Chicago Comment, supra
note 27, at 528-29 (1975); see also Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 545 (suggesting that secured
parties whose security interests are harmed be given tax credits).
46. The view that, in 1978, Congress could not have enacted retroactive legislation
outlawing adequate protection ignores the Supreme Court cases that had already denied
secured parties a legal right to adequate protection. In addition, this view against the
constitutionality of retroactive legislation also requires the further belief that the bankruptcy
clause of the United States Constitution means to distinguish radically between secured and
unsecured claims, such that claims in personam can be "taken" without compensation by
bankruptcy legislation, but claims in rem may not be. No one doubts that retroactive
bankruptcy legislation can impair unsecured claims. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186
U.S. 181, 188 (1902). But some old depression cases have been read to imply that no
retrospective impairment can occur for secured claims. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935) ("The position of a secured creditor, who has rights in
specific property, differs fundamentally from that of an unsecured creditor."). In Radford, the
Supreme Court struck down legislation that put a moratorium on all mortgages granted before
the legislation was passed. Id. at 601-02. In other words, the legislation had a strictly
retrospective effect. Id.
One interpretation of Radford that I have not seen made is that the constitutional sin in
that case was the purely retrospective effect of the Frazier-Lemke Act. Id. at 589. The same
Act, made applicable to future as well as past mortgages, would be constitutional. This
suggestion is based upon the following passage: "Because the Act is retroactive in terms and
as here applied purports to take away rights of the mortgagee in specific property, another
provision of the Constitution is controlling .... The bankruptcy power, like the other great
substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 589 (emphasis
added). My suggestion is that when Congress legislates generally about security interests in
bankruptcy, it is simply defining what a security interest is and is not "taking" property at all.
Such definitional work is within the police power of Congress. But what the Frazier-Lemke
Act did was not internal or definitional in quality. It was external in the sense that the
legislation moved beyond the purview of definition and attacked the rights of certain secured
parties, but not all of them, from the outside. Under such circumstances, Congress was guilty
of "taking," not defining, property.
Immediately after the Supreme Court issued the Radford opinion, Congress redrafted the
Frazier-Lemke Act with a view toward answering the concerns of the Radford opinion.
Although space limitations prohibit a longer critique, let me summarize by saying that the
Radford opinion was extremely vague and poorly written, and most of the changes in the
revised Act were almost all insubstantial and illusory, except that the new Frazier-Lemke Act
[Vol. 43:577
POSTPETITION INTEREST IN BANKRUPTCY
2. THE BENEFIT OF THE SECURED PARTY'S BARGAIN
The second premise in the legislative history-that secured par-
ties are entitled to the benefit of their bargain-requires some theory
that shows why unsecured general creditors are not likewise entitled
to the benefit of their bargain. In bankruptcy, the debtor will have
defaulted on many of her bargains. By definition, insolvency implies
the defeat of expectations. Therefore, an ethical justification for ade-
quate protection (or for whether security interests should survive in
bankruptcy, which is the same question) must extend beyond the
assertion that secured parties are entitled to the benefit of their bar-
gain. Such a slogan does not amount to a comprehensive ethical justi-
fication for any bankruptcy question.
It is safe to say, then, that the justifications cited by the legisla-
tive drafters are unconvincing. But ours is not entirely to reason why.
Adequate protection is now a potent reality in bankruptcy law. A
applied to old and new mortgages alike. The Supreme Court upheld the new Act in Wright v.
Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440 (1937). This supports
my thesis that bankruptcy legislation that is both retroactive and prospective might always
erode security interests; only purely retroactive legislation is an unconstitutional taking of
property.
The claim that the fifth amendment overrides congressional bankruptcy power must
ground itself on a radical distinciton between secured and unsecured debt. See United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1982); see also Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935) ("the position of a secured creditor who has rights in
specific property differs fundamentally from that of an unsecured creditor, who has none");
Anderson, supra note 27, at 1011-12 ("[A]ll parties to a contract are necessarily aware of the
existence of, and subject to, the power of Congress to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies.
Therefore, contracting parties are chargeable with the knowledge that their rights and
remedies are affected by existing bankruptcy laws and all future bankruptcy legislation.").
The distinction, however, cannot hold up. The claim by Anderson that people expect
bankruptcy to destroy contract claims and to preserve secured claims is circular. That is,
people expect what the law tells them to expect. Therefore, you cannot assert expectations to
justify the content of the law that engendered the expectation. Also, unsecured claims
transform themselves into secured claims when they are enforced, i.e., when a general creditor
obtains a judgment and a judicial lien in the course of enforcement. Therefore, secured and
unsecured claims are the same. Rogers, supra note 26, at 988-95. In addition, the rights of a
general creditor (under fraudulent conveyance law) are almost identical to the rights of an
unperfected secured party under Article 9. Since the latter idea is clearly a property right, then
general creditors also have property rights. Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a Property
Right, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 843 (1987). Furthermore, contracts are treated as property under
Article 9, when contract rights become collateral. Therefore, state law denies the distinction
between property and contract. Countryman, Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases,
82 CoM. L.J. 349, 359-60 (1977). Finally, courts have been willing to grant due process
protection to general creditors against whom bankruptcy discharge is asserted. Due process
protection of contract rights implies that contracts are "property" for the purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 158-59; Rogers, supra note 26, at 989.
This implies the falsity of a property-contract distinction for the purposes of the fifth
amendment. For these reasons, the claim that the fifth amendment preempts the bankruptcy
power-but only with respect to secured claims-is somewhat dubious.
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large percentage of all reported bankruptcy court decisions is dedi-
cated to figuring out whether unhappy secured parties are adequately
protected.
The avalanche of case law seems to have been just what Congress
intended, according to the authors of the Bankruptcy Code's influen-
tial legislative history. Rather than define the term, Congress defers
to the courts the task of developing an adequate protection doctrine.
4 7
Courts, then, are supposed to use their imagination to protect security
interests. But before that protective instinct can be consulted, we
need to know what entitlements are associated with the idea of
"security interest." Until we know that, we cannot imagine a "value"
that is to be protected. This leads us directly to the question of
whether secured parties are entitled to postpetition interest.
III. POSTPETITION INTEREST
The most confusing issue that arises in the development of a
coherent doctrine of adequate protection is whether the secured claim
is allowed to grow through the accrual of postpetition interest.48 This
is a substantive question that helps to define exactly what a security
interest is. Since every significant adequate protection issue is infused
with this controversy, there is no sense in proceeding any further until
we thoroughly examine entitlements to postpetition interest.
A. Under the 1898 Act
From the earliest days of the 1898 Act, the general rule was that
unsecured creditors were not entitled to postpetition interest. The
petition halted all interest accrual.4 9 The rule for secured creditors
was more complex. Those who were still oversecured by the time a
47. See Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan
Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("Adequate protection is not
defined in the Code. This omission was probably deliberate."). One commentator finds in this
principle a core meaning of adequate protection. Carey, Adequate Protection: Lost
Opportunity Costs After American Mariner, In re Briggs, and In re Timbers, 19 U.C.C. L.J.
317, 320, 333-34 (1987).
48. By postpetition interest, I mean the interest that accrued on claims after the
bankruptcy petition is filed but before the plan is confirmed or liquidation is completed. A
further note: if interest is allowed to accrue, then usually I have in mind that the trustee would
be required to reimburse the secured party with cash, additional collateral, or some form of
dollar-for-dollar compensation. I do not have in mind that the accrued interest augment an
unsecured deficit claim against the debtor.
49. Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116-17 (1893). One rationale given for this
rule is that the debtor was blameless if the court forbade the debtor from paying interest
pending the bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, interest was a kind of penalty and should
not accrue. American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266-68
(1914). Another reason given was to equalize those creditors who extracted ruinous interest
POSTPETITION INTEREST IN BANKRUPTCY
reorganization plan was confirmed were allowed to augment their
claims by interest accruing between the time the bankruptcy petition
was filed and the confirmation of the plan. 50 In addition, if the collat-
eral was income producing-for example, dividend-bearing stocks or
bonds-the income produced could be applied to the postpetition
interest of a secured party.5 This second rule was not necessarily
distinguishable from the first. Income-producing collateral could be
viewed simply as a case in which the collateral grows or increases,
thereby triggering the rule that over-secured parties could claim post-
petition interest.
The stated rule held that undersecured parties could not add
postpetition interest to the amount of their claim. A common justifi-
cation for this disentitlement was that an undersecured creditor
resembled a general creditor (not entitled to interest) more than she
resembled a secured creditor.52 The aesthetics of this analogy were
not usually pursued vigorously, but the analogy was nothing if not
venerable, going back at least to Sexton v. Dreyfus,53 a case in which
Oliver Wendell Holmes matched wits with Learned Hand. Sexton
involved cash proceeds of collateral that the trustee had already liqui-
dated. The undersecured parties wished to have the cash payment
applied to postpetition interest that had accrued before the sale; only
thereafter would principal be paid down. If the postpetition interest
claim were to be paid in cash, then the undersecured parties would
have a larger unsecured deficit to claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding. 54
Judge Hand approved this scheme to obtain postpetition interest.
His stated reason for doing so was to reconcile a contradiction
between two rules that applied to undersecured parties. Hand saw no
with those creditors who were more modest in their demands. Vanston Bondholders Protective
Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164 (1946).
50. See Coder v. Arts (In re Coder), 152 F. 943, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1907), aff'd, 213 U.S. 223
(1909).
51. Ex parte Penfold, 4 DeG. & Smale 282 (1851); Ex parte Ramsbottom, 2 Mont. &
Aryton 79 (1835).
52. "To allow a secured creditor interest where his security was worth less than the value
of his debt was thought to be inequitable to unsecured creditors." Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 164 (1946).
53. 219 U.S. 339 (1911), rev'gIn re Kessler & Co., 171 F. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd, 180
F. 979 (2d Cir. 1910).
54. See id. at 346. The modem claims to postpetition interest as part of adequate
protection will have a different posture. Modem undersecured parties argue that the
automatic stay should be lifted unless they receive an entitlement to postpetition interest, in
the form of either periodic cash payments or an augmented, fully collateralized claim. Here,
the undersecured parties were claiming the right to increase the size of the unsecured deficit, a
much less greedy claim than is characteristically made today.
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reason why undersecured parties whose collateral produced dividends
should get postpetition interest, while undersecured parties whose col-
lateral was fallow should be denied."5 In fact, as just suggested, the
contradiction Hand found could have been reconciled. Income pro-
ducing collateral simply increased the size of collateral, turning
undersecured parties into oversecured parties. The two rules, then,
could have been collapsed into one: Postpetition interest would be
allowed only when a secured party was oversecured.
The Supreme Court, led by Justice Holmes, reversed and ruled
that the undersecured parties' scheme to get postpetition interest was
illegal. Three grounds were cited.56 First, Holmes analogized under-
secured parties to general creditors, who were specifically denied
postpetition interest by the 1898 Act.5 7 By implication, they were less
analogous to oversecured parties, who could get postpetition interest.
In this analogy, Holmes posed the major ethical issue-equal treat-
ment-that modern proponents of postpetition interest entitlements
have yet to solve.58 Second, Holmes was unimpressed with the con-
tradiction that Hand had discovered (although not for the reason I
have stated). Holmes felt that the bankrupt estate should not profit
from income produced by collateral during the bankruptcy proceed-
55. In re Kessler & Co., 171 F. at 754.
56. Sexton, 219 U.S. at 346.
57. Id. at 344.
58. Id. The idea of equal treatment is a subversive one, because the minute you have
established a commensurability in one place, you are forever called upon to justify
noncommensurability elsewhere. Thus, if general creditors and undersecured parties are the
same, why aren't oversecured parties and undersecured parties the same?
One answer is hazarded by the court of appeals in United Sav. Ass'n. of Tex. v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1387,
aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988):
In summary, the interest provisions of the Code and its predecessors, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court for almost a century, are premised on the
equitable principle that the unencumbered assets of a debtor's estate will not be
used to benefit one class of creditors at the expense of another class. Such would
be the case if unencumbered assets, otherwise available for the payment of
unsecured claims, were used to pay postpetition interest on undersecured debt.
Allowing a claim for postpetition interest by an oversecured creditor, on the
other hand, is not inconsistent with that equitable principle, because only assets
encumbered by the creditor's lien will be used to fund the payment of
postpetition accrued interest.
Id. This argument is based entirely on a confusion of terms. The court wants to say that
debtor equity is already encumbered, so that if the oversecured creditor's claim for postpetition
interest continues to accrue, no unencumbered assets are being diverted to secured parties.
But debtor equity is part of the bankruptcy estate, and, until interest actually accrues, we can
and probably should say that it is entirely unencumbered. If so, then unencumbered assets are
being diverted to oversecured parties in violation of the principle that the court asserts. It may
simply be impossible, therefore, to justify both postpetition interest for oversecured parties and
no interest for undersecured parties.
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ing, when the undersecured party failed to receive interest.59 There-
fore, it was appropriate for the undersecured party to get interest
when the collateral produced income, but not otherwise. Hence, the
existing rules were rational and needed no reconciliation. And third,
Holmes noted that the reason the trustee retained the collateral rather
than abandoning it was to maximize the return. This would adhere to
the undersecured parties' advantage, if the trustee were successful.
Under the circumstances, it was fair that the undersecured parties
absorbed a little risk (by taking no postpetition interest entitlement) in
return6o
Beyond Sexton, almost no cases under the old Bankruptcy Act
expressly addressed undersecured parties' entitlements to postpetition
interest, perhaps because the question was thought to be settled
authoritatively.61 Yet there existed an indirect way in which courts
often did grant undersecured parties postpetition interest.
Under the 1898 Act, adequate protection was supplied as a mat-
ter of case law. If it was not supplied, then the secured party could
claim to be unduly harmed and could move to have the stay lifted.
One of the reasons that the secured parties were allowed to have the
stay lifted--even in reorganization cases-was that the debtor had no
equity cushion6 2 in the collateral.63 If the stay was lifted, the secured
59. Sexton, 219 U.S. at 346.
60. Id. at 345.
6 1. What few there are go against the secured party. See Freuhauf Corp. v. Yale Express
System, Inc. (In re Yale Express System, Inc.), 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1967) (refusing to
grant rent to secured parties, pending reorganization plan); Barth Equipment Co. v. Perlstein,
128 F.2d 253, 254 (2d Cir. 1942). O'Toole analyzes only one case in which this issue was
addressed, and even then the issue is far from explicit. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 154 (E.D. Pa 1973); see O'Toole, supra note 12, at 260-62.
62. For simple cases, "equity cushion" is the positive difference between (1) the relevant
secured claim and (2) the value of the collateral. In re Diplomat Elec. Corp., 82 Bankr. 688,
692 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). A more precise definition might be the difference between (1) the
relevant secured claim, any senior secured claims and chargeable sales expenses, and (2) the
value of whatever interest the debtor had in the collateral at the time the relevant security
interest attached or perhaps was perfected. See In re Simmons, 86 Bankr. 160, 161 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1988) (senior priority liens are to be deducted when calculating equity for a secured
party); LaJolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assoc. (In re LaJolla Mortgage Fund), 18
Bankr. 283, 287-88 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (emphasizing that the equity cushion for senior
and junior secured parties might be different). One court reminds us:
There is an obvious need to keep this concept of a "value cushion" separate from
the term "equity" of the debtor, which in conjunction with a lack of necessity of
the property to an effective reorganization will require granting of relief from the
stay under section 362(a) .... [U]se of the term "equity cushion" is a misnomer
and contributes to confusion of the issue of whether a creditor's interest in the
debtor's property is adequately protected and the separate issue of whether relief
from the stay should be granted because of an absence of need for the property
for an effective reorganization.
Because the debtor's lack of an "equity" was equated with a lack of
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
party was free to foreclose, obtain cash proceeds, or reinvest the pro-
ceeds, thereby obtaining a kind of postpetition interest through invest-
ment. Conversely, the stay endured if there was a cushion. This
cushion also guaranteed the accrual of postpetition interest. The
effect of this standard was that, as a practical matter, secured parties
did receive postpetition interest one way or the other. Either the stay
was lifted, so that postpetition interest could be obtained by foreclos-
ing immediately and reinvesting the cash proceeds, or the equity cush-
ion existed, so that postpetition interest accrued.
By requiring an equity cushion, courts may not have thought
they were insuring the recovery of postpetition interest. It was usu-
ally said that the reason for insisting on the equity cushion was not to
guarantee the continued accrual of interest (which in fact did take
place), but to protect the face amount of the secured party's claim.'
An express requirement that the equity cushion always be large
enough to cover postpetition interest never existed. Furthermore, no
court conditioned the stay on the payment of postpetition interest in
cash--only on the existence of equity against which postpetition inter-
est could accrue. But to the extent the courts did not require the
cushion, undersecured parties did have an entitlement to postpetition
interest under the 1898 Act. Consequently, the express formulation of
the rule in Sexton disagrees with the implicit rule in reorganization
"adequate protection" of the creditor's interest in the subject property, the
court's lifting of the stay was reversed in In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1984).
The term "equity cushion" is but one of several unfortunate terms which
unnecessarily contribute to muddled issues in the courts, but it has had a wide
use and probably will linger on.
In re Digby, 47 Bankr. 614, 622 n.21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985). For an exemplar of confusion,
see In re Lewis, 83 Bankr. 682, 683 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). In Lewis, the debtor-farmers
owed $330,000 on land worth $167,000. They had just filed a plan in which they would pay
the mortgagee the market value of the land. The mortgagee claimed that the stay had to be
lifted for lack of debtor equity. Id. at 682. The court found that the debtor had equity: "[A]s
a practical matter, it would be somewhat unusual for a Bankruptcy Court to hold that the
debtor had no equity in such a situation. It seems clear that Congress intended family farm
debtors to be allowed to reorganize on the basis of an equality of assets versus debt." Id. at
683. I think what the court meant was that the land was necessary to a reorganization, which
also prevents the stay from being lifted. Used in such a context, the idea of equity is unneces-
sary and confusing.
63. Silver Gate Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Carlson (In re Victor Builders, Inc.), 418 F.2d 880,
882 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Riker Delaware Corp., 385 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1967);
Northwestern Fin. Investors v. O.K. Motels (In re O.K. Motels), 1 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB)
416, 419 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1974); see generally Kennedy, Stay Under Old Act, supra note 1, at
244-50; Webster, Collateral Control Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clear Rules v. Judicial
Discretion, 51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 229-37 (1977).
64. Id. at 209.
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cases. To put it another way, the theory and the practice of bank-
ruptcy law were not in accord.
Because the debtor equity requirement was usually characterized
as protecting the right to principal, and not the right to interest, not
all courts insisted on the presence of a cushion if other protections
were adequate.65 Some commentators therefore openly urged that the
requirement of debtor equity be dropped when other adequate protec-
tion was supplied and when the collateral was necessary to a success-
ful reorganization.66 This was in fact accomplished in the Bankruptcy
Code.67  Nevertheless, because courts commonly insisted that the
debtor have equity in the collateral, secured parties commonly did
receive postpetition interest prior to 1979. Furthermore, it is very
important to recognize that, in spite of the dicta in Sexton, there was
no settled rule on postpetition interest for undersecured parties. Usu-
ally they received it in one form or another, but sometimes they did
not.68
65. Freuhauf Corp. v. Yale Express System, Inc. (In re Yale Express System, Inc.), 384
F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967); Lincoln-Alliance Bank & Trust Co. v. Dye, 108 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1939). In some of these cases, the collateral produced income, which itself was part of the
collateral, so that the growth of the collateral still covered accruing interest. Crystal v. Green
Point Say. Bank (In re Franklin Gardens Apartments, Inc.), 124 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1941).
66. One commentator noted:
Equity is, indeed, a "red herring" .... Equity ... is an indication that the
security can depreciate in value while the debtor uses it without affecting the
secured creditor's interest. It is not a mystical talisman, the presence of which
miraculously empowers a court to make decisions it would not make in the
absence of equity.
Webster, supra note 63, at 231.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
68. Another point can be made. Recall that one of the exceptions granted undersecured
parties postpetition interest when the collateral produced income. In a reorganization,
collateral retained as useful to the continuation of a business helps to create income.
Obviously the connection between stock and dividends, for example, seems a great deal closer
than a telephone system and income from a service business. But no accountant would have
been embarrassed to attribute a portion of firm earnings to various pieces of hardware making
up the business. Therefore, it was open to argue that the "income" exception should have
allowed postpetition interest for undersecured parties in all reorganizations in which the
business continued to earn income. One commentator suggested this argument late in the
game, but no court ever adopted it under the Bankruptcy Act. See Anderson, supra note 27, at
1022. Nevertheless, this idea was always implicit in the doctrines under the 1898 Act, so that it
cannot exactly be said that the 1898 Act had a consistent position on postpetition interest.
More recently, a pair of commentators have opposed such an accounting assumption in a
somewhat different context. Baird & Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of
the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 780-82 (1988). Specifically, Baird and
Jackson object to the notion that collateral in a business be given a "going concern" valuation.
Their basic point is an appeal to a natural law of causation. They maintain that going concern
value is "caused" by managerial expertise and not by pieces of hardware on which
management depends. Id. at 782. Such a claim is based on a confusion. In their article, Baird
and Jackson assume that management has some sort of sine qua non relation with going
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B. Under the Bankruptcy Code
The Bankruptcy Code continues the express rule that general
creditors get no postpetition interest.69 Similarly, the Code continues
to allow oversecured creditors to get postpetition interest.70  The
Bankruptcy Code, however, is extremely vague on the rule for under-
secured parties. The Supreme Court has now decided that under-
secured parties are not to get postpetition interest, at least as a matter
of right.7'
1. THE STATUTES
Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code expressly grants postpeti-
tion interest to oversecured parties. 72 This specific grant often is taken
to imply that, since the existence of the cushion is a condition of an
interest entitlement, undersecured creditors may not get interest on
their claims.73 Nevertheless, it still remains true that undersecured
parties still deserve "adequate protection" of their security interests as
concern value. In other words, "but for" management, going concern value would not exist.
Id. This may describe some management, but in many organizations, managers are fungible-
more so than managers would like to admit.
Furthermore, appeals to natural concepts of causation do not cut any ice whatsoever.
Modern legal philosophers tend to view causation as purely a legal, not a factual, question.
This is thought to be the major insight of the Coase Theorum. See Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); see also Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
777, 779 (1972) ("With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to
either define or determine each individual's contribution to this output of the cooperating
inputs. The output is yielded by a team, by definition, and it is not a sum of separate outputs of
each of its members"). Therefore, Baird and Jackson presuppose the very proposition-who
caused what?-that they set out to justify.
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (disallowing unaccrued interest). If there is
a surplus in the bankruptcy estate then they get the mediocre legal rate. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5)
(1982).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
71. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 108 S. Ct. 626, 635 (1988).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value
of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than
the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim,
interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for
under the agreement under which such claim arose.
Id.
73. An exception exists if the secured party holds boats or planes as collateral. Section
1110(a) provides that the automatic stay does not ground planes or beach vessels, unless the
trustee agrees to comply with the security agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986); see also id. § 1166 (pertaining to railroad rolling stock). In addition, new Chapter 12,
pertaining to farm reorganizations, provides rental payments to mortgagees as a form of
adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 1205(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). See infra text accompanying
note 123.
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a condition of continuing the automatic stay in bankruptcy.74
It has been suggested that adequate protection provides under-
secured parties with the interest entitlement that Section 506(b) fails
to give. Adequate protection is not defined precisely, but Section 361
suggests three possible definitions:
adequate protection may be provided by-
(1) requiring the trustee to make ... cash payments... to the
extent that the stay . . . [or] use, sale, or lease . . . results in a
decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing . . . an additional or replacement lien to the
extent that such stay ... results in a decrease in the value of such
entity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief ... as will result in the realiza-
tion by such entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's
interest in such property.75
In spite of the negative implication in Section 506(b),76 each of these
provisions plausibly suggests that postpetition interest payments
could be an element of adequate protection. If true, adequate protec-
tion provides undersecured creditors with an entitlement to postpeti-
tion interest that Section 506(b) fails to give them.77
Take the first suggestion for example: periodic cash payments to
the extent the automatic stay decreases "the value of such entity's
interest" in the collateral.78 If state law defines the parameters of the
"entity's interest," then surely the secured party has a right to repos-
sess, sell, and obtain cash from the proceeds of the enforcement sale.
The "value" of this interest-to a third party assignee who might buy
out the undersecured creditor's position-is detrimentally affected if
an automatic stay prevents those rights from being enforced, render-
ing distant the prospect of a cash recovery. The value of that interest
would be restored by "periodic cash payments." What else could
those payments be but interest on the secured portion of an under-
secured creditor's claim?
79
74. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986) ("To the extent that ... .
77. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.),
780 F.2d 1339, 1347 (8th Cir. 1985).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
79. E.g., In re Deeter, 53 Bankr. 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); Molbert, Adequate
Protectionfor the Undersecured Creditor in a Chapter 11 Reorganization: Compensation for the
Delay in Enforcing Foreclosure Rights, 60 N.D. L. REV. 515, 520 (1984). The leading case in
favor of postpetition interest proclaims this the "plain meaning" of § 361. Crocker Nat'l Bank
v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 430
(9th Cir. 1984).
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There is a counter-reading, however. The attributes of the
entity's interest might be constituted, not only by state law, but also
by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In other words, a security
interest is defined as a lien that is not foreclosable, so long as the
automatic stay is in place."0 If susceptibility to the automatic stay is
part of the definition of a security interest, adequate protection does
not require protection against the economic effects of the inability to
foreclose. Stated differently, Section 361(1) protects the secured party
from declines in the value of the collateral, but not from the decline in
value of the secured claim itself."1 Or, to state the theory in yet a
third way, the automatic stay in bankruptcy may be viewed as having
a procedural, not a substantive, effect on security interests.8 2 Under
any version of this counter-reading, the secured party is required to
absorb the cost of delay that bankruptcy entails. As a result, the
"value of such entity's interest" implies no entitlement to postpetition
interest at all. 3 Notice that under such a counter-reading, the
secured party is not protected from the stay. Rather, she is only pro-
tected from declines in the market for the items of collateral.8 4 Yet
80. This reading was adopted by the lower court in Timbers of Inwood Forest:
"Furthermore, the 'bargain' which the creditor enters into incorporates the applicable
requirements of federal bankruptcy law. . . . Two aspects of the law, of course, are the
automatic stay ... and the interest provisions of § 502(b)(2) and § 506(b). The stay and the
interest provisions themselves substantially alter the bargain of the parties." 793 F.2d 1380,
1414 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct.
626 (1988).
81. "Clearly [Section 361(1) does not] authorize[] periodic payments to a creditor whose
collateral is not decreasing in value." Id. at 1388. Here we see the custom of courts,
confronted with an ambiguous and confusing statute, trying to bolster their dubious arguments
with such pejoratives as "clear," "obvious" and "plain meaning."
82. Continental I11. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 681
(1935). This kind of formulation attempts to make it seem as though the rights of the secured
party are completely unaffected, but the strategy is based on a syllogistic mistake. Those
making such an argument claim that (a) procedural matters do not harm substantive rights,
(b) the automatic stay in bankruptcy is merely a procedural matter, therefore (c) the automatic
stay must do no harm to the rights of a secured party. See In re Empire Steel Co., 228 F.
Supp. 316, 319 (D. Utah 1964) (right of a secured party "depends not only upon assurance of
eventual payment but the right to payment or enforcement in point of time").
83. For a case making the counterreading, see In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19
Bankr. 819, 825-26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). It is usually assumed that, in Section 361(1),
Congress intended to codify the holding of In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971),
and that the cash payments to the secured party were strictly related to depreciation of the
collateral, not to postpetition interest. Gordanier, The Indubitable Equivalent of Reclamation:
Adequate Protection for Secured Creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
299, 312-13 (1980).
84. Hoyt, Inc. v. Born (In re Born), 10 Bankr. 43, 48 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) ("Under the
concept of adequate protection the secured creditor's interest in the property cannot be
damaged because of the automatic stay."). But see United States v. Smithfield Estates, Inc. (In
re Smithfield Estates, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985). In refusing to lift the stay, or
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Section 361 strongly implies that the secured party is to have protec-
tion from the stay.
The second suggestion in Section 361 for adequate protection
also implies postpetition interest for the undersecured creditor.
Instead of periodic payments, Section 361(2) proposes extra collateral
to the extent the automatic stay decreases "the value of such entity's
interest" in the collateral.8 5 As before, the amount a third party
would pay an undersecured creditor to take over her position is detri-
mentally affected by an automatic stay that defers receipt of cash pay-
ment. To this extent, the secured party might be given additional
collateral. "This extent" is nothing more than interest on the secured
portion of the undersecured creditor's claim. The secured party gets
an increased lien instead of periodic cash payments.8 6 Stated differ-
ently, interest accrues and is added to the undersecured creditor's
secured claim, for which the the trustee must supply additional
collateral.
This view of adequate protection presupposes that the value of
the undersecured creditor's claim is assessed from the viewpoint that
no automatic stay is or will be in effect (that the value protected is
based on the prepetition attributes of a security interest). If, on the
other hand, both state law and the automatic stay provision of the
Bankruptcy Code describe the attributes of the security interest, then
adequate protection implies no entitlement to postpetition interest.
Finally, Section 361(3) suggests that the undersecured creditor
grant postpetition interest the Smithfield Estates court, in a case in which no equity cushion
existed, stated:
An undersecured creditor's position is not worse immediately after the filing than
it was just prior thereto, and the provisions for adequate protection may only
protect the secured creditor from any impairment in the value of its interest that
is attributable to the stay. The concept of adequate protection was not designed
or intended to place an undersecured or minimally secured creditor in a better
post-filing position than it was before the stay.
Id. at 914-15 (emphasis in original). This view is not comprehensible. How can it be said that
lifting the stay puts a secured party in a better position than she was before the bankruptcy?
85. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
86. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Timbers of Inwood Forest,
thought that adequate protection inevitably meant payment in cash, which would defeat many
reorganization proceedings before the plan was formulated. 793 F.2d 1380, 1409 (5th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988). But clearly deferred
interest payments are authorized by section 361(2), where helpful. The ability to defer actual
payments of accruing interest was emphasized by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 397 (8th Cir. 1986) (interest need
not be paid until harvest time), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988),
vacated and remanded, 844 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1988); Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American
Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus. Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 433 (9th Cir. 1984).
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be given an "indubitable equivalent" to her state-law rights.8 7 This
mellifluous phrase has been plagiarized from In re Murel Holding
Corp. , a famous old opinion by Learned Hand. In Murel, Judge
Hand held that, in order for a reorganization plan to be confirmed,
the secured parties had to be completely compensated:
And.. . payment ten years hence is not generally the equivalent of
payment now. Interest is indeed the common measure of the differ-
ence, but a creditor who fears the safety of his principal will
scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his money or at least
the property. We see no reason to suppose that the statute was
intended to deprive him of that ... unless by a substitute of the
most indubitable equivalence.
8 9
The above quote demonstrates that the phrase "indubitable equiva-
lence," as originally used by Hand, is directly connected to the idea of
postpetition interest.90
Yet even here, one can argue that there is no "plain meaning" of
indubitable equivalence, for we need to know what is equivalent to
what. For example, if the security interest is defined solely by state
law, then the undersecured party does not bear this cost, if one
assumes that the secured party would have repossessed the collateral
and obtained cash proceeds expeditiously. 9 On the other hand, if the
security interest is defined as "state law plus the automatic stay," so
that the undersecured party assumes the cost of bankruptcy delay,
then the secured party gets the indubitable equivalent of her security
interest without obtaining postpetition interest.
Postpetition interest for undersecured creditors is not the only
idea conveyed by the concept of adequate protection, but it is note-
worthy that the three statutory suggestions can arguably be connected
with an entitlement to postpetition interest. Each idea, however,
87. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3) (1982).
88. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp. (In re Murel Holding Corp.), 75
F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). Section 361(3)'s phrase "indubitable equivalent," 11 U.S.C. § 361(3)
(1982), was a last minute replacement for the word "value," contained in H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963,
6296. The word "value" in Section 361(3) would have implicated a postpetition interest
entitlement in the same manner as it did in Sections 361(1) and (2). Compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 361(3) (1982) with 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. IV 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1982).
89. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
90. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 108
S. Ct. 626 (1988); see Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain
Models of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983).
91. This is essentially the objection to this argument posed in United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380,
1388-89 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
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depends on the view that the thing valued is the undersecured credi-
tor's claim against the collateral, as a would-be assignee of the under-
secured creditor's position might value it, if bankruptcy's automatic
stay were not in the picture. But if the would-be assignee takes the
view that the automatic stay is a reality, then the assignee will dis-
count the value of the secured claim by the amount of time necessary
to collect that claim. Note that terms like "value" or "indubitable
equivalent" cannot tell us what the undersecured creditor's legal enti-
tlements are because "value" and "equivalence" depend upon a preex-
isting legal entitlement. Yet it is this very legal entitlement that is in
question.
92
To summarize, in determining the meaning of adequate protec-
tion, we have to hypothesize a "value." Value of a legal entitlement
depends upon what rules constitute the entitlement. Do we hypothe-
size a value based on the absence of an automatic stay or a value
based on the reality of an automatic stay? Nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code tells us this. Happily, the Supreme Court has spoken.
2. Timbers of Inwood Forest
The Supreme Court has ruled out the possibility that adequate
protection routinely implies postpetition interest. Writing for a unan-
imous court in United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs.93 Justice Scalia admitted that Section 361 can be read
to favor postpetition interest for undersecured parties, 94 but he stated
92. An interesting but failed attempt to show that Congress intended to award postpetition
interest as part of adequate protection appears in Chicago Note, supra note 25, at 312-13. The
author notes that Congress rejected the holding of In re Yale Express System, 384 F.2d 990
(2d Cir. 1967), and refused to allow administrative priority, in lieu of collateral, to serve as a
means of adequate protection. See Chicago Note, supra at 313. From this, the author infers
that Congress did not want secured parties to bear the risk that the collateral might dissipate in
a failed reorganization. Id. Furthermore, refusing to grant postpetition interest likewise
makes secured parties bear the risk of a failed organization. Id. at 314 n.42. Therefore,
Congress must have intended to award secured parties postpetition interest.
This argument, though seemingly clever, overlooks the fact that Yale Express put an
admitted entitlement of a secured party at risk. The question we are asking, however, is
whether postpetition interest should be an entitlement. If not, then nothing is at risk. Hence,
one is not required to draw from this a view of congressional intent. The author raises similar
types of arguments about congressional intent, but each time, the author cites a provision of
the Bankruptcy Code that protects the value of an admitted entitlement of a secured party. Id.
at 318-19. It is not possible to draw from such instances any learning about whether
postpetition interest should be an entitlement.
93. 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
94. Scalia concedes this grudgingly: "The term 'interest in property' certainly summons
up such concepts as . . . 'security interest' more readily than it does the notion of 'right to
immediate foreclosure.' " Id. at 630. Scalia is about to separate the concept of "security
interest" and "right of foreclosure," a dubious dichotomy indeed.
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that Section 361 must be read in a way that makes sense of the rest of
Bankruptcy Code (as if that were possible!)." Scalia has five different
interpretive arguments for the view that adequate protection does not
require an undersecured creditor to receive postpetition interest.
None of them is a drop dead argument, and some of them are demon-
strably wrong. Let's review them one at a time.
a. Deriving the Meaning of Adequate Protection
From Section 506(a)
First, in searching for the meaning of Section 361, Justice Scalia
notes that the key words are "such entity's interest. '9 6 These words
also appear in Section 506(a).97 Scalia reasoned that if the meaning of
Section 506(a) is understood, then the problem of Section 361's mean-
ing will also be solved.9
Section 506(a) requires a bankruptcy court to divide an under-
secured claim into two claims-one perfectly secured and one per-
fectly unsecured. It provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the
value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such
allowed claim.99
In noting that the words from Section 361 also appear in Section
506(a), 100 Scalia asserts that "the creditor's 'interest in property' obvi-
ously means his security interest without taking account of his right
to immediate possession of the collateral on default."' 0 1 Anytime a
judge says that a meaning is obvious, you can be sure that just the
opposite is true! Meanings that are obvious do not have to be
described as such, for the very reason that they are obvious.
Although the meaning is far from obvious, Scalia reads the creditor's
"interest in property" as meaning no more than the dollar amount the
creditor could expect to receive from the proceeds of collateral after
an enforcement sale. 102 These words therefore exclude the possibility
of postpetition interest.
95. Id. at 630.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
98. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 630.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
101. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 630.
102. Id.
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The claim that the word "interest"-as in "security interest"-
contains this meaning may or may not be valid. Even if true, the
exact words in Section 506(a)-and Section 361-are "the value of
such creditor's interest."10 3 In other words, the creditor's interest
may be the dollar payment after a foreclosure sale, but the value of
that interest depends heavily on when the creditor might expect to
receive the dollar payment. If the funds can be received relatively
quickly (as in an unopposed Article 9 enforcement sale), the value of
the creditor's security interest might be one thing. But if the funds
can be had only after a Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, the value might
well be lower. We are therefore back to figuring out exactly what it is
that the Bankruptcy Code "adequately protects"-a security interest
defined by state law or a security interest defined by state law plus
bankruptcy's automatic stay.
Writing about the meaning of the words as they appear in Sec-
tion 506(a), Scalia tries to show that, if he is wrong, absurd results
would follow! In this regard he is half-right! While the consequences
he predicts are absurd, they do not follow:
the "value of such creditor's interest" would increase, and the pro-
portions of the claim that are secured and unsecured would alter,
as the stay continues-since the value of the entitlement to use the
collateral from the date of bankruptcy would rise with the passage
of time. No one suggests this was intended.' °4
This argument is deeply confused. It may be observed that, over time,
the face amount of the secured claim will increase if interest is
allowed to accrue, but face amount is economically meaningless.
Value is what counts in financial markets, and Section 361 calls for
protection of value. If face amount is allowed to increase by the
accrual of postpetition interest, the value of the secured claim (as of
today) may stay the same, if the right interest rate is chosen. It will
not necessarily increase, as Scalia suggests. The change in the face
amount of a claim is inevitable if the value of the claim is to be pro-
tected. In arguing that postpetition interest entitlements change the
value of an undersecured creditor's claim, Scalia confounds the con-
cept of value and face amount and therefore has not developed a
strong argument for his view that undersecured creditors have no
postpetition entitlement to interest. 105
103. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) (emphasis added); 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
(emphasis added).
104. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 630.
105. Scalia also objects that, if postpetition interest is awarded, "the proportions of the
claim that are secured and unsecured would alter, as the stay continues." Timbers of Inwood
Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 630. If the face amount of the secured claim increases and the face value
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b. Adequate Protection and Section 506(b)
Justice Scalia's second argument is based on the observation that
Section 506(b) 116 conditions postpetition interest on the presence of an
equity cushion.107 Scalia infers from this entitlement that under-
secured creditors have no entitlement to postpetition interest. 0 8
In response to the argument that adequate protection supplies
undersecured creditors the entitlement that Section 506(b) denies
them, Scalia remarks:
If the Code had meant to give the undersecured creditor, who is
thus denied interest on his claim, interest on the value of his collat-
eral, surely [Section 506(b)] is where the disposition would have
been set forth, and not obscured within the "adequate protection"
provision of § 362(d)(1). Instead of the intricate phraseology set
forth above, § 506(b) would simply have said that the secured cred-
itor is entitled to interest "on his allowed claim, or on the value of
the property securing his allowed claim, whichever is lesser." Peti-
tioner's interpretation of § 362(d)(1) must be regarded as contra-
dicting the carefully drawn disposition of § 506(b)."°
This passage establishes a kind of reverse "Ockham's Razor" argu-
ment: If Congress intended postpetition interest for undersecured
creditors, then it could have developed a less complicated statutory
structure than it did." 0 The complexity of the Code under the
postpetition interest view therefore strongly suggests that this view is
not the intent of Congress."'
of the unsecured deficit remains the same, this is true. But so what? It is hard to see why a
fixed proportional divison between secured and unsecured claims is important. If it is, it could
be achieved by paying the undersecured parties periodic cash. A concern about secured/
unsecured ratios therefore does not compel a view concerning entitlements to postpetition
interest.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
107. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 631.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis in original). In this quote, Scalia is trying to make a very tricky
distinction. He wants to suggest that adequate protection involves interest on the collateral,
whereas Section 506(b) involves interest on the claim. This distinction is superficially
plausible. Suppose A (who is senior) and B (who is junior) each have $100 claims against $150
worth of collateral. A is entitled to interest on the "claim" of $100. B is entitled to interest on
$50 which seems to be interest on collateral. This distinction ignores Section 506(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which makes clear that B has two claims--one that is fully secured for $50,
and one that is fully unsecured for $50. Therefore, B, as well as A, would be getting
postpetition interest on her claim.
110. The theory of Ockham's Razor states: If two theories explain reality, and one theory is
much simpler than the other, choose the simpler theory. Scalia argues that if a text produces a
complicated or a simple reality, choose the simple reality.
111. A variation on this argument is presented in Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in
Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1082 (1985). Fortgang and Mayer worry that the
accrued interest is not part of the secured claim itself and therefore must be paid out later as if
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As Judge Jones in her dissent in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pointed out, this argument can be
turned against Scalia.'" 2 The Fifth Circuit took the position that, in
Section 361, "value of an entity's interest in the debtor's property"
means "value of the collateral." '"13 Jones observed, "If Congress had
wanted to limit adequate protection to a decline in the value of the
collateral, it could have done so, but did not."' 14 Each of these oppos-
ing arguments assumes a certain natural state of affairs that Congress
had the burden of counteracting. But neither argument proves the
basis on which the presumed background state of affairs was natural.
For example, the stated rule under the Bankruptcy Act was
clear-no postpetition interest for undersecured parties. Nothing in
the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code strongly suggests an
intent to change the rule." 5 From this perspective, adequate protec-
tion ought to mean no interest for undersecured parties. But it will be
recalled that the theory and the practice of the Bankruptcy Act
diverged. We have seen that to the extent courts insisted on debtor
equity as a condition of continuing the automatic stay, undersecured
it were an administrative expense. Upon confirmation of the plan, administrative expenses in
Chapter II must be paid immediately in cash. Secured claims can be paid in debt instruments
not presently mature (although their value must be equal to present cash). As a result
oversecured creditors in a Chapter I 1 plan can be forced to take time instruments, whereas
undersecured parties get cash straight out (for the amount of the interest).
None of this necessarily follows at all. We can treat postpetition interest as part of the
secured claim. As such, it may be added to the allowed secured claim of the undersecured
party. In any case, if time instruments are really equal to present cash, none of this matters.
In a perfect market, creditors are indifferent between cash now or debt instruments bearing the
market rate of interest. (Of course, we know that, in fact, cash is much better. You don't need
to pay a broker to dispose of it, for starters. And time instruments are valued according to the
court's judgment, which may in fact be wrong in a prejudicial way.).
112. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 108 S.
Ct. 626 (1988).
113. Id. at 376.
114. Id.
115. See General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village Inc. (In re South Village, Inc.), 25
Bankr. 987, 992-96 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). Judge Mabey's scholarly opinion against
postpetition interest for undersecured parties stresses the fact that advocates for secured
parties complained about the absence of a postpetition entitlement for undersecured parties,
but Congress chose to do nothing in response. Id. at 994 n.8. This seems to assume that
Congress did do nothing about postpetition interest, the very question Judge Mabey had been
asked to decide. Cf Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 793 F.2d at 1395-96. The Court stated:
Not one of the many witnesses for secured creditors even mentioned the award of
postpetition interest payments or sought compensation for the delay required by
the stay. Viewed in this context, it seems unlikely that Congress intended the
adequate protection provisions to require periodic payment of postpetition
interest to an undersecured creditor.
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parties did receive a kind of postpetition interest entitlement." 6 We
therefore are forced to choose between what judges said and what
judges did. Thus the background conditions against which the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code can be read are controversial. No one interpre-
tation can be passed off as natural." 
7
c. Postpetition Interest and Rent
In his third argument, Scalia worries about whether postpetition
interest entitlements for undersecured parties would invade the turf of
Bankruptcy Code Section 552,1 which both disencumbers postpeti-
116. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
117. Another kind of argument against postpetition interest made from Section 506(b)
occurred in the original court of appeals decision in United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1407.08 (5th
Cir. 1986), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988). According to
Judge King (n6e Randall), (1) oversecured parties may not get postpetition interest until a
reorganization proceeding is over, because it is impossible to know what administrative
expense is chargeable to the collateral until then. This, of course, is a very dubious
proposition. Bankruptcy proceedings routinely rely upon estimates of value, and such
administrative expenses must of necessity be estimated anyway, as part of a good valuation. In
re Boring, 91 Bankr. 791, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (citing but rejecting some contrary
authority).
In any case, King goes on to argue that (2) undersecured parties would necessarily have a
present right to cash payments, if it were true that adequate protection required postpetition
interest for undersecured parties. There is no justification for this view either; section 361(2)
can be read as direct authority for deferring the payment of accruing interest. (King thought
that Section 361(2) could logically apply only to protecting the value of collateral, not the
value of the secured party's claim. She thought postpetition interest could only be justified by
section 361(3), the "indubitable equivalent" subsection. She saw that the phrase came from In
re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935), which provided for actual cash payments
and, unjustifiably, assumed that "indubitable equivalent" must mean cash payments only, not
deferred payments.). But see In re Wright, Egan & Assoc., 60 Bankr. 806, 807 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1986) (failure to pay interest in cash was cause to lift automatic stay); In re Graves, 59
Bankr. 928 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); In re Augustus Court Assocs., 46 Bankr. 619, 620
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (failure to meet contractually scheduled payments a per se reason to
lift the automatic stay). A later opinion from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania interprets
these precedents as cases in which no equity was present. As such, they simply become
opinions in which undersecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest. See In re
Morysville Body Works, Inc., 86 Bankr. 51, 57 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
To return to Judge King's views, King deduces from the above two wrongheaded
premises that (3) undersecured parties must not get postpetition interest because to do so
would be to treat undersecured parties better than oversecured parties. Obviously, this
conclusion is delegitimated by the errors in the premises. Also, King did not see that refusing
to give undersecured parties postpetition interest means that totally unsecured parties get
better treatment than undersecured parties-in cases in which there is a surplus in the
bankrupt estate. This is because Section 726(a)(5) gives postpetition interest to unsecured
creditors in case the estate has a surplus, whereas undersecured parties do not get postpetition
interest. See supra text accompanying note 69. This is an argument that Scalia will
acknowledge but dismiss as an unavoidable contradiction. The point is that no view on
postpetition interest can render the Bankruptcy Code completely consistent.
118. Section 552 provides:
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tion property from prepetition after-acquired property clauses in
security agreements and saves the secured party's right to proceeds
and rent. The right to rent is preserved, however, only if the secured
party had the right to it under state law.'19 Scalia fears that postpeti-
tion interest as part of adequate protection amounts to the right to
rent even in cases in which state law did not permit the secured party
to have rent.
1 20
At the appropriate levels of generality, all things are the same or
all things are different. Thus Scalia is not totally wrong when he
asserts that rent and interest are the same thing. Rent is to property
what interest is to money-both are charges for use. A secured
party's right to rent and a secured party's right to postpetition interest
do seem similar in that both are the right to income streams after
bankruptcy. Although they are the same in this respect, they are also
different. 2 ' For one thing, interest is something the debtor owes to
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by
the estate by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any
lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the
commencement of the case.
(b) Except as provided in section 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of
this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement
of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such property,
then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law,
except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise.
II U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 1986).
119. Scalia writes:
Section 552(b) . . . makes possession of a perfected security interest in
postpetition rents or profits from collateral a condition of having them applied to
satisfying the claim of the secured creditor ahead of the claims of unsecured
creditors. Under petitioner's interpretation, however, the undersecured creditor
who lacks such a perfected security interest in effect achieves the same result by
demanding the "use value" of his collateral under § 362. It is true that § 506(b)
gives the oversecured creditor, despite lack of compliance with the conditions of
§ 552, a similar priority over unsecured creditors; but that does not compromise
the principle of § 552, since the interest payments come only out of the
"cushion" in which the oversecured creditor does have a perfected security
interest.
Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 631-32 (emphasis in original).
120. Id.
121. See In re Turner, 82 Bankr. 465, 469 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1988) (denying the
connection between rent and interest and stating that rent must compensate for any declining
market values); In re Offerman Farms, Inc., 67 Bankr. 279, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)
(awarding third party rent accruing after bankruptcy while denying a right to postpetition
interest).
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the creditor. Rent is conceived in Section 552 as something a lessee of
the debtor owes to the debtor but which is assigned to the creditor. ,
2 2
Furthermore, postpetition interest increases the size of the secured
claim, and postpetition rent increases the size of the collateral. They
are mirror images of each other. In addition, they are not necessarily
related. The right to interest rarely equals the right to rent, which a
debtor has against a third party. In fact, economically, one expects
that interest is less than rent; otherwise, the landlord-borrower is bet-
ter off defaulting. Thus, although it is possible to say that "interest is
rent," it is also possible to say the opposite. For this reason, Scalia's
argument has no logical bite to it.
123
d. The Indifference of Undersecured Parties
Scalia's fourth argument must be given a poorer grade than his
other arguments have received. Scalia bases his argument on the fact
that, if adequate protection requires postpetition interest sufficient to
preserve the prepetition value of the underwater security interest, then
an undersecured creditor becomes indifferent to the automatic stay in
bankruptcy. 24 Now one would have thought that the purpose of ade-
quate protection would be to do just that! But Scalia fears that, if the
122. One can easily argue for a rental award from the debtor to the creditor in such
circumstances when the debtor herself uses the collateral in lieu of a third party. In re Glinz,
69 Bankr. 916, 921-22 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (disallowing postpetition interest but allowing
rent payments by the debtor to the secured party). That is not the kind of rent Section 552
seems to be talking about, however. See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
123. One hint about the rent-interest relationship that Scalia ignored was a new
rehabilitative chapter for farmers that Congress passed in 1986. This new chapter specifically
provides "reasonable rent[al]" payments to mortgagees as a form of adequate protection. 11
U.S.C. § 1205(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). According to legislative statements pertaining to
Chapter 12, rental payments were expected to be less than opportunity cost payments. H.R.
REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 49-50 (1986); see United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 368 (5th Cir.
1985) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
In Timbers of Inwood Forest, the majority opinion of the Fifth Circuit disagreed over the
inferences to be drawn from the fact that Congress has provided a potential rent entitlement as
part of adequate protection in farm cases. 808 F.2d at 369. According to the majority, the
failure of Congress to give interest in the new farm rehabilitation chapter showed that
Congress disdained postpetition interest generally. Id. In other words, the majority thought
rent (which was awarded) to be different from interest. Id. The dissent suggested that Section
1205 endorses compensation for opportunity costs, even in farm cases. Id. at 379. In other
words, the idea of rent can be viewed as tantamount to postpetition interest. Id. Hence, we
have judges disagreeing over whether rent and interest are "the same" or "different."
124. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 632. This assumption shows that Scalia has
read too much law-and-economics. Just because a judge has made an award of interest with
the idea that a creditor will be rendered indifferent does not mean that the creditor is
indifferent. That depends on whether the judge is right on the money-not too high and not
too low-in estimating a market interest rate. Such an occurrence happens in mathematical
models but not usually in real life.
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secured parties' protection was truly adequate, it would "make[ ] non-
sense" 125 out of Section 362(d)(2)1 26 of the Bankruptcy Code. And in
order to achieve "sense" for 362(d)(2), it is necessary for adequate
protection to be inadequate (itself no mean bit of nonsense).
Section 362(d) provides two reasons why the automatic stay
might be dissolved. First, the stay might be dissolved for lack of ade-
quate protection. '27 Second, if adequate protection has been awarded,
Section 362(d)(2) allows further grounds for relief if there is no collat-
eral cushion and no need for the property in a reorganization.
Justice Scalia argues that if an undersecured creditor is indiffer-
ent to the automatic stay once she receives the postpetition-interest
version of adequate protection, then the undersecured creditor has no
incentive to use Section 362(d)(2) for relief.128 In other words, if ade-
quate protection is too good, Section 362(d)(2) is deprived of its neces-
sity. Since every statutory clause must have a purpose, the view that
adequate protection includes postpetition interest must be wrong,
according to Scalia.1
29
Unfortunately for this argument, one can think of a utility to
Section 362(d)(2) if undersecured parties get postpetition interest. A
decision by a bankruptcy court on adequate protection does not prove
the undersecured creditor feels adequately protected. The under-
secured creditor may feel that the bankruptcy court has awarded an
insufficient amount of postpetition interest, or that the undersecured
creditor could do better under state-law systems of enforcement. In
such a case, the undersecured creditor can move for relief under Sec-
tion 362(d)(2). Thus, if undersecured parties are entitled to postpeti-
tion interest, they still have an incentive to utilize Section 362(d)(2).
e. The Implications of Standards for Confirming a Chapter 11
A fifth argument used by Justice Scalia is a positive flop. The
petitioner had argued that the concept of adequate protection implied
a right to postpetition interest because a Chapter 11 provision also
required that the undersecured creditor receive "present" value of the
security interest.1 31 In other words, the petitioner argued that, if
Chapter 11 required dissenting secured parties to receive the present
value of their claims, then so did the adequate protection requirement.
125. Id.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
128. Timbers ofInwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 632.
129. Id. This argument also persuaded Judge Mabey. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan
Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 811 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
130. Timbers ofInwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 633.
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Scalia defeats this argument by noting that Chapter 11 requires the
dissenting secured party to get present value of her claim "as of the
effective date of the plan."'' 3' This implies that the cost of delay pend-
ing confirmation of the plan rests on the undersecured creditor.
This argument proves way too much. Not only does it prove
that the undersecured creditor gets no interest, but it also proves that
the undersecured creditor gets no adequate protection at all. For
instance, between the time the bankruptcy petition is filed and the
Chapter 11 plan is confirmed, the collateral might deteriorate from
use in an ongoing business. Under Scalia's argument, this deprecia-
tion cost would also be borne by the undersecured creditor. Yet such
a meaning clearly contradicts the requirement for adequate protection
and therefore must be rejected. Adequate protection trumps the
inference Scalia drew from Section 1129(b)(2)(A). 132 This conclusion
throws us back to the issue of what adequate protection means in and
of itself.
Using a similar argument, Scalia also tries to defeat the sugges-
tion that the phrase "indubitable equivalence" is connected to postpe-
tition interest. 133 He notes (correctly) that Learned Hand required
that the secured party be paid present value as of the time a Chapter
11 plan was confirmed, not the time the bankruptcy petition had been
filed. The phrase "indubitable equivalent" therefore can say nothing
about postpetition interest before the plan is confirmed.
34
This attempt suffers from precisely the same overbreadth I have
just described. If "indubitable equivalence" never requires anything
more than value of the secured claim at the time a plan is confirmed,
then "indubitable equivalence" rules out any sort of adequate protec-
tion before that time: "indubitable equivalence" as a means of ade-
quate protection means no adequate protection is required at all!1 35
131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. 11 U.S.C. § ! 129(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108
S. Ct. at 633.
133. Id. at 633-34.
134. Id.; see Note, Adequate Protection and the Automatic Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code:
Easing Restraints on Debtor Reorganization, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 423, 435-36 (1982).
135. The opposite argument was made by Judge Jones, dissenting in the Fifth Circuit. She
claimed that, since "indubitable equivalent" implies "present value" in Section
I129(b)(2)(A)(iii), it must also imply present value in Section 361(3). Timbers of Inwood
Forest, 808 F.2d at 380; see Chicago Note, supra note 25, at 321; see also MBank Dallas N.A.
v. O'Connor (In re O'Connor), 808 F.2d 1393, 1398 (10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit
stated:
[P]rior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization, the test of that protection is
not by the same measurements applied to the treatment of a secured creditor in a
proposed plan. In order to encourage the Debtors' efforts in the formative period
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3. THE TRUSTEE'S STATUS AS HYPOTHETICAL LIEN CREDITOR
Because none of the arguments hazarded by Justice Scalia is very
persuasive, I would like to contribute one of my own. One possible
hint of meaning might be gleaned from a source overlooked at all
levels of the Timbers ofInwood Forest case: the status of a trustee as a
hypothetical lien creditor under state law. The theory goes as follows:
A bankruptcy trustee is considered to have the powers of a hypotheti-
cal lien creditor on the day of bankruptcy.' 36 This means that, on the
day a bankruptcy petition is filed, the debtor transfers property to the
trustee as if the trustee possessed an enormous judicial lien on
whatever equity the debtor had in the secured party's collateral.
This hypothetical lien creditor status is a kind of "what if" exer-
cise based on the idea that bankruptcy can be viewed as a collective
creditors' remedy that displaces individual remedies. Subjunctive
"counterfactual" speculation always plays an enormous role in the
debate over adequate protection and postpetition interest entitle-
ments. Usually, the argument for giving undersecured parties postpe-
tition interest rests on the supposition that, but for bankruptcy, the
secured party would have repossessed the collateral, foreclosed on it,
and earned interest. 37 Instead of imagining that there had been no
bankruptcy, as is usually done, the hypothetical lien creditor idea asks
us to imagine that, but for the bankruptcy, a judgment creditor under
state law has induced a sheriff to levy on the collateral. This collateral
cannot be sold, however, because there is no debtor equity. Now the
sheriff cannot determine whether there is or is not debtor equity until
she holds an auction and fails to get a bid. Until then, the absence of
prior to the proposal of a reorganization, the court must be flexible in applying
the adequate protection standard.
Id. An elaborate argument based on confirming Chapter 11 plans was asserted by Judge King
(ne Randall) in the original Fifth Circuit opinion. See Timbers ofInwood Forest, 793 F.2d at
1409-10. In this argument, King supposes again (erroneously) that adequate protection for
undersecured parties inevitably implies immediate cash payments to them; no deferred interest
payments could be used. Id. Therefore, King thought important distributional decisions had
to be made, not according to the careful and detailed provisions of Chapter 11, but according
to the rushed, emergency provisions of Section 362(d) involving the lifting of the stay. Id.
This, King thought, would violate the intent of Congress in developing a painstaking informa-
tion-gathering procedure in Chapter 11 for actually distributing the bankrupt estate. Id. Since
King was wrong in her assertion that adequate protection must imply immediate cash payment
instead of adequately protected deferred cash payments, this argument can be dismissed as
invalid.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
137. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment ofDiverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection ofSecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI.
L. REV. 97, 105, 115 (1984); Note, The Cost of Realization by a Secured Creditor in
Bankruptcy, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1975).
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debtor equity is a mere prediction. Pending the attempted sale, the
sheriff is obliged to retain the collateral. Once it is clear that there can
be no sale because there is no debtor equity, the sheriff then returns
the collateral to the secured party. 38 If this were the counterfactual
history, it ought to be clear that the undersecured party could not
collect interest for the delay from either the sheriff or the judgment
creditor. Similarly, in bankruptcy, when a trustee "levies" for the
benefit of all the general creditors, undersecured parties should not be
able to get postpetition interest from the trustee or the general credi-
tors. Under this view, the trustee's hypothetical status as lien creditor
cuts against the idea that undersecured parties should get postpetition
interest.
4. SUMMARY
As we have seen, the Bankruptcy Code fails to yield a clear
answer as to whether adequate protection requires undersecured par-
ties to receive postpetition interest. Justice Scalia has purported to
find a clear meaning against postpetition interest, but his arguments
derived from the text of the Bankruptcy Code are weak at best. One
cannot say that he has successfully read the Code in the "holistic' ' 39
manner he claimed. But more to the point is whether a holistic read-
ing of the Bankruptcy Code is even possible. If a complete coherent
vision cannot be adduced from the Bankruptcy Code,"4 does it make
sense to achieve a purely local reconciliation of a few provisions cho-
sen at random? If not, then perhaps this enterprise can be abandoned
in favor of some ethical or public policy considerations, to the extent
they can be located.
Speculation on the ethics of postpetition interest will not neces-
sarily be wasted. In Timbers of Inwood Forest, an undersecured party
requested and failed to receive postpetition interest on its secured
claim.' 4' This does not inevitably mean that undersecured parties
138. Ordinarily, junior judicial lien creditors cannot foreclose or affect senior security
interests. See Carlson, Death and Subordination Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 5
CARDOZO L. REV. 547, 567 (1984).
139. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 108 S. Ct. at 630.
140. Justice Scalia candidly admits this is impossible. Id. at 634. He acknowledges that his
reading of the Bankruptcy Code means that, in case the bankruptcy proceeding produces a
surplus, the unsecured creditors receive postpetition interest while the secured portion of the
undersecured claim does not. Id. "It would be disingenuous to deny that this is an apparent
anomaly .... " writes Justice Scalia, "but it will occur so rarely that it is more likely the
product of inadvertance than are the blatant inconsistencies petitioner's interpretation would
produce." Id. Scalia therefore puts himself in the position of claiming that he can tell which
inconsistency must be endured as "inadvertent" and which inconsistency must be obliterated
by a local reconciliation, even though total reconciliation is impossible.
141. Id. at 626.
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may never receive postpetition interest as part of adequate protection.
Some courts prior to Timbers of Inwood Forest have ruled that, while
an undersecured party has no absolute right to postpetition interest as
part of adequate protection, it nevertheless is within the discretion of
bankruptcy courts to give it.I42 Nothing in Timbers of Inwood Forest
seems to preclude a doctrine of discretionary awards of postpetition
interest. 43 In addition, a venerable Supreme Court decision from
long ago generally described interest entitlements as a matter of
equity for courts. 4'" Thus, if reasons for postpetition interest can be
developed, perhaps it is still possible for judicial discretion to fill in
the gap left by positive congressional intent.
The next two Sections examine the ethical status of postpetition
interest entitlements for undersecured parties. The first of these Sec-
tions discusses economic accounts of postpetition interest, and the
second examines the noneconomic justifications.
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POSTPETITION INTEREST
One explanatory instinct that law professors indulge in is that
law serves a purpose. That is, for any given law there is a purpose that
can be deduced from it. It is healthy to be skeptical of such instru-
mental accounts of law. Law is not always the tool that satisfies the
wants and desires of a prelegal self. Sometimes, it helps to constitute
142. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.),
780 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1985); see also United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 374 (5th Cir. 1987) (Clark, J.,
concurring) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988) (Cash payments for lost opportunity costs
are not always prohibited.).
143. For a post-Timbers case upholding postpetition interest entitlements, see In re
Milleson, 83 Bankr. 696 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988). In Milleson, the court lifted the automatic
stay because the bankruptcy proceeding threatened to eat away enough of the equity cushion
to deprive the secured party of postpetition interest. Id. at 700-01. See also In re Rivers, 89
Bankr. 1007 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (refusing to apply Timbers of Inwood Forest retroactively
to a case in which interim postpetition inierest had been awarded); In re Sherwood Square
Assoc., 87 Bankr. 388 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (same).
144. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946) ("It is
manifest that the touchstone of each decision on allowance of interest in bankruptcy,
receivership and reorganization has been a balance of equities between creditor and creditor or
between creditors and the debtor."). For what it is worth, Section 552(b) states that a secured
party is entitled to postpetition proceeds, offspring, rents, and so forth "to the extent provided
by such security agreement and by applicable non-bankruptcy law, except to any extent that
the court ... based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise." 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. IV
1986) (emphasis added). If a court has equitable power to manipulate the postpetition growth
of the collateral, it is not a far stretch to suppose that the court may also manipulate the
postpetition growth of the secured claim as well. One author, however, draws the opposite
inference: because Congress was competent to give express equitable powers here, it must have
intended no equitable powers with regard to postpetition interest. See O'Toole, supra note 12,
at 269.
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our wants and desires. The effects law has on society are always
extremely complicated and counterintuitive. Having said this, how-
ever, it cannot be denied that legal rules sometimes do affect human
behavior. When they do, law-and-economics becomes a possibility.
There are two types of law-and-economics: one that is dubious
and another that is dubious in the extreme. The merely dubious ver-
sion of law-and-economics simply tries to predict how people will
react to a given law. The ethical meaning of that action is not
assigned. This prediction of human behavior is a kind of sociology of
law, except that, instead of real humans with historical passions, this
brand of law-and-economics assumes all people are self-serving profit
maximizers. The enterprise is dubious because, although profit maxi-
mizing is a genuine human desire from time to time, often it is mixed
with other sentiments. Therefore, prediction of what selfish people
will do is not necessarily valid for cases in which people are not totally
selfish.,
If this kind of economics is simply bad sociology, it is neverthe-
less better than the extremely dubious version of law-and-economics,
which goes further and not only tries to describe human behavior, but
also tries to tell us whether that behavior is good or bad according to
a utilitarian standard. This is welfare economics. A welfare econo-
mist can assign positive and negative values to all human behavior
caused by law and can then tell you whether the law increases or
decreases human happiness. Laws that create more pleasure than
pain are called "efficient." Often net aggregate happiness is expressed
in fictional units called utils. This is a very egalitarian practice if all
humans are assumed to have an equal entitlement to utils. Sometimes
net aggregate happiness is expressed in terms of wealth. The norm of
wealth maximization is very inegalitarian because it assumes that peo-
ple are entitled to whatever happiness they can buy on the basis of
how much money they have (with no questions asked about how they
got their money).
This Section of the Article examines whether postpetition inter-
est for undersecured parties might have some instrumental effect on
human behavior and whether that effect (if it exists) is efficient.
Postpetition interest for undersecured creditors might affect human
happiness in one of three ways. First, if we institute a postpetition
interest entitlement for undersecured parties, the added entitlement
might induce secured lenders to lower the price of secured loans. Sec-
ond, the entitlement might affect the behavior of bankruptcy trustees.
And third, the incentive might cause "forum shopping," a phenome-
non assumed to be evil. In this Section, I examine these three pos-
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sibilities and critique a prominent pseudo-law-and-economics position
taken by Professor Douglas Baird and Dean Thomas Jackson.
A. Lower Interest Rates
The first suggestion is that postpetition interest entitlements will
lower the cost of secured debt. 45 This lower cost could appear in two
different forms. Secured parties could either offer lower interest rates,
or they could demand less collateral. Either form is the equivalent of
a price reduction.' 4 6 This reaction-lower prices-is not automatic,
even if creditors are always rational (which they are not). Economic
theory itself can explain why creditors might be indifferent to legal
change. If default and the possibility of extended bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are viewed as such low probabilities that the cost of thinking
about them exceeds the benefit of doing so, then it would follow that a
postpetition interest entitlement would have no effect on the price of
secured credit. In other words, this issue may be too trivial for real
businesspersons to pay attention to at the time a price for a loan is
set.1
47
This is especially true in the case of postpetition interest entitle-
ments, since the amount of judicial delay is not necessarily expected
to be great, compared to collection delays that would otherwise occur
after a default. According to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit:
In the case of most Chapter 11 debtors.., a plan of reorganization
can be effectuated, if at all, within a matter of months, not years.
An occasional Chapter 11 debtor, for example, one with a complex
debt structure or multifarious business problems, may take more
time. However, the existence of such a debtor is the exception, not
145. See Schorer, supra note 14, at 68.
146. If a secured party takes less collateral and keeps the interest rate the same, the debtor
is still benefited because some collateral still remains available to give to a future creditor who
might otherwise be unsecured. That future creditor will then lower her interest charge, even if
the original secured party does not. See Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 308 n.89 (1984).
147. Law professors flatter themselves by assuming that what concerns them concerns
ordinary people, but this is not necessarily the case. Robert Gordon calls this assumption
functionalism and points out that the assumption just happens to accord to lawyers a very
important place in our culture. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 78-79
(1984). When scholars do empirical studies, they frequently find that secured lenders do not
react at all to unfavorable changes in the law. E.g., Shuchman, Data on the Durrett
Controversy, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 605, 607 (1987) (failing to find an effect in loan pricing from
a well-known ruling that low bids at foreclosure sales could be fraudulent conveyances). In
response, law-and-economics practitioners have an infinite opportunity to show that these
studies were marred by countervailing effects on loan prices that prevent the effect of their
theories from being realized. Therefore, the assertion that people react to changes in the law
ends up being a nonfalsifiable proposition.
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the rule. 148
The expected brevity of a bankruptcy proceeding must be com-
pared to the time it would take secured parties to foreclose under state
law. In some cases, this period can be very long.' 49 Thus, even if
postpetition interest is awarded from the time foreclosure would have
occurred (in order to replicate what the secured party would have
received if there had been no bankruptcy), many bankruptcy proceed-
ings will have ceased by then. In such cases, undersecured parties will
get no postpetition interest at all. Such an expectation minimizes the
effect of postpetition interest entitlements on the price of a loan.
In any loan, the chances of default are sure to be low and within
the narrow scope of this unlikely event, a bankruptcy rule on postpeti-
tion interest could be relatively unimportant (when viewed at the time
the loan is being negotiated). Whether the price of credit will fall is
therefore an empirical question the answer to which should not be
easily assumed.'50 But, even if the price of secured credit falls as a
result of an extra bankruptcy entitlement, it does not follow that the
decline in prices is efficient in the welfare sense. Welfare efficiency is a
utilitarian standard that judges human events (including law) on the
basis of whether it increases happiness (or sometimes wealth) in the
world. Although both the secured party and the debtor would be
happy enough at the lower price of secured credit, third parties might
feel differently. The postpetition interest entitlement denies general
creditors funds they previously would have had. If the general credi-
tors react to the postpetition interest entitlement by raising the price
of their loans, then the debtor will be better off only contingently-
only if the decline in the price of secured credit exceeds the hike in the
148. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988).
149. See Greives v. Bank of W. Ind. (In re Greives), 81 Bankr. 912, 964-65 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1987) (two months as to farm machinery and livestock); In re Glinz, 69 Bankr. 916, 919-
20 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (same); In re Asbridge, 66 Bankr. 894, 900-01 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986)
(fifteen months on North Dakota ranch); In re Bessey, 65 Bankr. 638, 644 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1986) (7.5 months on California home requiring repair); Waas, Letting the Lender Have It:
Satisfaction of Secured Claims by Abandoning a Portion of the Collateral, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J.
97, 101 (1988) (emphasizing delay in foreclosing on agricultural real estate).
150. This is not to say that it is unimportant to the parties at the time of bankruptcy. But in
this version of the economic argument, we are trying to figure out the effect of a bankruptcy
rule on the price of credit, which is given long before a bankruptcy proceeding is imminent.
Analogously, those of us who play the lottery and buy a dollar ticket are not, before the
drawing, profoundly affected by the chance of a $1 million prize. But the prize matters to us a
lot if we hold the winning ticket. Similarly, a bankruptcy rule that enriches a particular
creditor may mean little to creditors in general at the time creditors price their loans.
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price of unsecured credit.' 51 Thus, in order to have a position on
whether postpetition interest entitlements are efficient, one must also
have a position on what effect secured credit has on the net cost of
credit. '52
Even if the net interest burden of the debtor were to be decreased
by a postpetition interest rule (an empirical fact that must not be
assumed), there is yet another impediment to declaring postpetition
interest entitlements efficient. This impediment relates to what econo-
mists call the "second best" phenomenon. The "second best" doc-
trine tells us that what appears inefficient in a "perfect market" might
be efficient in a market with imperfections because countervailing
inefficiencies cancel each other out and produce an allocation of
resources closer to the perfect market model.
To illustrate, let us define a "firm" as the aggregate value of the
creditors' claims and the debtor's equity. Those people without legal
claims against the debtor are therefore excluded from the firm. It is
unambiguously efficient for the debtor to maximize her position only
if, (1) by doing so, she also maximizes firm value-the aggregate value
of the debtor's equity and the creditors' claims, and (2) the firm does
not cause harm to any person who is not a member of the firm.
Debtor-maximizing activity might still be efficient if one of these two
conditions is not met, but only ambiguously so. In other words, the
efficiency of debtor-maximizing activity will have to be proven empiri-
cally, or at least be consistent with our intuitions -about the facts,
because efficiency will depend on weighing the costs against the
benefits.
The two conditions for a priori efficiency are very -hard to
achieve. A debtor might maximize its own position but not that of
the firm. Or a debtor might maximize firm value but still create more
151. As is true for secured parties, one must always question whether general creditors care
enough about marginal bankruptcy rules to be affected by them. If they do not, then a shift in
the rule on postpetition entitlements simply transfers wealth from one person to another, an
event that does not necessarily have any efficiency significance.
152. The lead article asserting the efficiency of postpetition interest entitlements waffles
about. Professor Douglas Baird and Dean Thomas Jackson write:
Our argument . . . does not rest on an assumption that secured credit, as it
currently exists under state law, is worth having. Even though the institution of
secured credit in its present form may not be easy to justify, we need rest on
nothing more than the fact that it exists.
Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 137, at 110-11. But, later Baird and
Jackson state that secured credit is probably efficient. Id. at 112 n.52 ('It is entirely possible,
and indeed very likely, that those who insist on secured credit, and those, including sharehold-
ers, who do not, do so for a reason, and that this reason advances the interests of all investors,
creditors and shareholders alike"). Thus, these authors assert simultaneously that secured
credit is "not ... easy to justify" and is "very likely" efficient. Id. at 110-11, 112 n.52.
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harm to nonfirm members than net benefit to firm members. For
example, a corporation might undertake a risky strategy that lowers
the overall value of the firm but raises the price of the common shares.
Such a strategy maximizes the debtor's position (the position of share-
holders), but fails to maximize firm value. In such a case, even if
there are no externalities, the strategy is inefficient. Creditors absorb
the full downside risk, but are cut off from the full benefits of the
upside risks; shareholders could lose their investments, but have
unlimited upside potential. Together, the value of common shares
increases, but the value of the firm decreases even more.
Alternatively, maximizing debtor value and firm value could be
inefficient. For example, a debtor might move a factory to a country
with lower wage rates. This move might increase the value of the
corporation's stocks and bonds and might even increase the value of
all legal claims against the firm, but it harms dismissed workers who
suffer displacement costs and local suppliers who can't find replace-
ment business. Neither of these harms is currently redressable with a
legal claim. These harms are "externalities." 15 3 The move just
described might be firm-maximizing, but in the welfare sense, it might
be inefficient. For welfare efficiency, the benefits to the firm (and to
others) must be weighed against the harm to nonfirm members, such
as workers and suppliers.
Now suppose a debtor proposes an investment that is profitable
only so long as tort victims and pollution victims have no legal claims
or are unable to bring legal claims against the firm. Nevertheless, the
probability is high that such tort victims will suffer harm without
"joining the firm." It would be efficient for this firm never to come
into existence because it creates more harm in the world than benefits.
Unsecured creditors might balk at lending because the risks of insol-
vency (from prospective tort claims that may or may not be asserted)
are so great that the expected income from the firm cannot cover the
debt service. Secured creditors, however, are immune from tort
claims by virtue of their security interests. If the firm can now meet
debt service because secured creditors charge less, then an inefficeint
firm is brought into existence. In this instance, the security interest is
inefficient.
Applying these thoughts to postpetition interest entitlements,
153. If you think foreigners have utilities that should be counted, one should take into
account the benefits and harms obtained because the factory will be opening up in their
neighborhood.
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there might be, at the margin,154 a few inefficient firms that will not go
forward if the price of secured debt is high due to the unavailability of
postpetition interest. These same firms would go forward if the price
of secured debt falls (thanks to the change in the postpetition interest
rule). In such a case, the change in the rule might be inefficient, if the
harm created by inefficient firms exceeds the benefit created by the
efficiencies of lower credit costs. The balance of costs and benefits
cannot be known deductively-only inductively. This illustrates the
"second best" effect. In a perfect market, a postpetition interest rule
may seem efficient, but because of externalities, the rule may be ineffi-
cient in the real world.
In the end, whether highly leveraged firms in the aggregate do or
do not create externalities when they maximize firm value is a difficult
empirical fact that cannot be assumed one way or the other. For this
reason (the problem of the "second best"), it is not very fruitful to
speculate on the efficiency of postpetition interest entitlements in
bankruptcy from the perspective of its effect on the cost of lending. 5
B. The Effect of Postpetition Interest on Trustees
It is sometimes suggested that refusing undersecured creditors
postpetition interest skews the choice between liquidation and reor-
ganization. The claim is that, if undersecured parties do not get
postpetition interest, then DIPs will be offered rent-free collateral, or
interest-free loans. These subsidies will then induce a DIP to keep a
business alive when the business is worth more in liquidated piece-
meal form. As a result, this incentive leads to inefficiency.15 6 This
154. When economists use the phrase "at the margin," what they mean is that most of the
time the incentives created by law don't make a dime's worth of difference.
155. Second-best arguments 'are everywhere, all the time. For this reason, welfare
economists prefer to ignore them. They ignore them, however, at the expense of the validity of
their enterprise. Indeed, because of the blizzard of counterincentives that always exists, I offer
the following maxim: The better law-and-economics becomes, the less it can say. The more
irresponsible and unscientific it becomes, the bolder and more impressive are its conclusions.
156. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857, 875 (1982) (fearing "distorted evaluation of the relative merits of
reorganization versus piecemeal liquidation"). This argument also seems to be the import of
Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 137, at 121-25. In favoring a rule
under which undersecured creditors get full postpetition interest entitlements, they write: "A
rule that forces general creditors and shareholders to give secured creditors the full value of
their claims (including compensation for the time value of money) puts the cost of a decision to
reorganize the firm entirely on the junior [claims] ...." Id. at 125.
Later in the Article, however, these authors worry at length about who would fardles bear
in light of the law's delay. That postpetition interest affects the amount of judicial delay a
bankruptcy trustee prefers is a much better claim, but Baird and Jackson do not explicitly
connect the effect of a postpetition interest rule to the trustee's incentive to delay.
In contrast, Judge Jones, dissenting in United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
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theory is quite wrong, however, and those who believe it have fallen
for the "sunk cost" fallacy. In theory, postpetition interest entitle-
ments can have no effect on this choice between liquidation and con-
tinuing the business.
The decision whether to liquidate or continue is governed by
rules pertaining to confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. If the plan is
successfully confirmed, the business is continued. If the plan is not
confirmed, or it appears that confirmation is impossible, the firm is
liquidated. At the time of the decision to confirm a plan or liquidate,
postpetition interest actually paid to undersecured parties beforehand
cannot affect the decision.
Two requirements for the Chapter 11 plan make clear why this is
true. First, secured parties must get the present value of their
claims. 57 Present value implies that, if the secured parties receive
debt claims in lieu of cash or the collateral, the debt claims must carry
sufficient interest to guarantee an equivalence between their rights in
the collateral and the actual debt instruments they receive. Second,
under the Bankruptcy Code, a DIP can propose a reorganization plan
only if the plan produces for every dissenting creditor no less than a
prospective liquidation.' s This means that there comes a point in the
course of a reorganization proceeding when a DIP must choose
between a future liquidation and a future reorganization. With
respect to this decision, a rule on postpetition interest prior to the
termination of the proceeding has no effect. In other words, even if
enormous transfers of wealth from secured to unsecured creditors
have already taken place, these transfers cannot affect the purely pro-
spective choice between liquidation and reorganization. No future
thefts can occur under the theory of Chapter 11 plans because all
creditors must get cash or the equivalent of cash-that is, interest-
bearing debt. A purely prospective decision concerning whether to
liquidate or to reorganize is therefore immune from any influence of
postpetition interest entitlements.
Instead, the incentive created is for DIPs to maximize the length
of time before they have to choose. It is during this period that thefts
of value from undersecured creditors occur. The longer the delay, the
more value a DIP can steal from undersecured parties. Any incentive
Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 1987)
(dissenting opinion), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988), clearly sees that judicial delay pending the
decision to liquidate or to reorganize is the harmful effect produced by refusing to give
undersecured parties postpetition interest. She never bothers with the effect of a postpetition
interest rule on the decision between liquidation and reorganization, and properly so.
157. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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therefore is not felt when a DIP formulates the plan. The incentive is
felt at or near the date of bankruptcy, when the DIP must decide to
delay the court proceeding or to terminate the court proceeding early.
It is irrelevant to this incentive whether the eventual termination is in
the form of reorganization or liquidation.
The chance to obtain rent-free use of collateral that otherwise
would be repossessed by secured parties might be desirable to DIP
management, but (putting aside the question of externalities) it is inef-
ficient if and only if a firm that should be liquidated immediately pro-
duces positive income that is less than the opportunity costs of the
secured and unsecured creditors combined. For example, suppose the
following: (1) General creditors, if given their bankruptcy dividends
in an immediate liquidation, could earn an income stream presently
worth $10, and undersecured parties could earn an income stream
worth $10. (2) During the period of bankruptcy delay, the DIP pro-
duces income worth $19. If undersecured creditors are paid $10, con-
tinuation is worth only $9 to the general creditors. Given these
numbers, there should be an immediate liquidation and no strategic
delay. Now, suppose that (3) undersecured parties cannot obtain
postpetition interest until the bankruptcy proceeding is over, so that
the present value of the undersecured party's legal rights falls to $8.
This means that the DIP can divert an income flow from these under-
secured parties worth $2. In this situation, the general creditors pre-
fer bankruptcy delay to immediate liquidation because their
bankruptcy dividends, given the delay, are now worth $11, one dollar
more than the $10 they could have earned in an immediate liquida-
tion. Only under such conditions does judicial delay fail to increase
the value of the firm. The key variable is that the difference between
the general creditors' positions in and out of bankruptcy delay is less
than the value that can be seized from undersecured parties by refus-
ing to pay them interest,' 59 or:
lcred- Going concern
What general ce-value available to
itors could earn if vleaalbetliquidation is general creditors Value stolen from
immediate and all (if undersecured < undersecured cred-
iedae ad creditors get post- itors ($2)
dividends are paid petition interest)
out early ($10) ($9)
But even here, the inefficiency of refusing to give undersecured
159. A mathematical version of this formulation is presented in the Appendix to this
Article.
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parties postpetition interest presupposes a DIP management that per-
fectly maximizes the position of unsecured creditors and produces no
externalities. If the DIP acts optimally in this situation, then a case
might be made for the inefficiency of the current rules-at the margin.
Unfortunately, we are unwise to assume that DIP management
always behaves this way. Recent economic literature emphasizes
"agency costs"-the cost of self-serving fiduciaries who do not behave
in the optimal fashion."6 In the case of judicial delay, DIP managers,
whose duty really calls for liquidation, might nevertheless keep a firm
alive solely to earn salaries, fees, and perquisites for themselves. In
such a case, management would keep a firm going under judicial pro-
tection, even when the general creditors are worse off. If this incen-
tive is operative, a rule that prevents wealth transfers from
undersecured parties might not have any effect on DIP behavior.1 6
In other words, the chance to steal from the general creditors is all the
incentive a self-serving DIP needs to maximize judicial delay. Conse-
quently, if the rule is changed, some DIPs might not cut down on the
preferred amount of judicial delay.
The failure of bankruptcy trustees to act in the interest of general
creditors is addressed through various means of judicial supervision.
Since this supervision exists anyway, it could be cost effective for
courts to supervise judicial delay in order to protect the position of
undersecured parties. As judicial diligence increases and delay
declines, the harmful effects of inefficient going concerns will be
minimized. 162
160. For a discussion of this literature in a debtor-creditor context, see Bratton, Corporate
Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
161. Judge Jones, in her dissent to the Fifth Circuit opinion, believes that a postpetition
interest entitlement for undersecured parties would protect general creditors from self-serving
DIP management because, as a result, the DIP will be forced to close down earlier. Timbers of
Inwood Forest, 808 F.2d at 383 (dissenting opinion). This argument doesn't work. If DIP
management files for Chapter I 1 because it wishes to churn high priority fees, a postpetition
interest obligation will force the managers to share the kitty with secured creditors, and this
sharing will hasten the demise of the firm. But it doesn't help the unsecured creditors any,
unless the unsecured creditors actually get part of the kitty. Postpetition interest entitlements
for undersecured parties do not help unsecured creditors in gaining access to this wealth.
Still, one might argue that, at the margin, a requirement of postpetition interest gives self-
interested managers less to steal, and hence makes the choice of remaining with the DIP less
attractive in comparison to moving on to their next best employment opportunity. This
argument is attractive, but, as a strictly economic argument, it is dubious. It is similar to the
one rightwing politicians and Malthusian economists sometimes assert about welfare to the
poor-if we cut off welfare, the recipients will go out and get a job and become productive.
The argument depends on the assumption that the next best opportunity is indeed socially
productive, which may very well not be the case.
162. See id. at 371-72; General Elec. Mortgage Corp. v. South Village, Inc., (In re South
Village, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 987, 1000-02 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
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In any case, we must not assume that the bankruptcy trustee is
the only one affected by rules on postpetition interest. The secured
parties themselves are affected. One writer creatively argues that
refusing to give postpetition interest is a good incentive to convince
the undersecured party to agree to a low-cost consensual workout. If
the undersecured party is indifferent to bankruptcy, the other claim-
ants have less leverage to get the undersecured party to agree to a low-
cost, prepetition loan workout. 63  Another writer suggests that
unhappy undersecured parties are useful in judicial supervision-they
have an incentive to bring to the court's attention the undue delay of
DIP management.'"4 And a third writer points out that a no-interest
rule simplifies the issues between debtors and creditors and holds
down litigation costs. ' 65 These good incentives surely should count in
any efficiency analysis of postpetition interest entitlements.
C. Forum Shopping
It has been alleged that failure to give undersecured parties
postpetition interest would, in the words of Judge Jones of the Fifth
Circuit, "create a rush of forum-shopping by debtors into the already
beleaguered bankruptcy courts .... Dissenting from a ruling that
denied an absolute entitlement to postpetition interest, Jones thought
that the consequences of forum shopping would be "profound."'' 67 By
"forum shopping," I assume that Jones is making an economic argu-
ment-that incentives to use bankruptcy courts would be inefficient.
An objection to the forum shopping theory is that, if bankruptcy
is an efficient forum, then incentives to use it should be counted as a
good thing. It is only if bankruptcy is ambiguous that incentives
cause concern. Furthermore, the very ambiguity of bankruptcy might
cause counterincentives that are just as healthy. We have seen that, if
secured parties are harmed by bankruptcy, they have an incentive to
agree to informal loan workouts that might be more efficient than a
163. See Note, supra note 134, at 433.
164. See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 545. The lower court in Timbers ofInwood Forest
was particularly enamored of this point. United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1407 (5th Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
165. See Schorer, supra note 14, at 66. It should be pointed out that reducing litigaton
costs is not per se efficient. Litigation costs are usually transfers of wealth from one party to
another. Wealth transfers have no obvious effect on total aggregate wealth. Some further
demonstration is needed to show that enriching lawyers and accountants is inefficient.
166. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., (In re Timbers of
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bankruptcy proceeding. The case for the inefficiency of incentives
therefore must be based on transaction costs. In other words, we
must ask whether the costs for bargaining out of an inefficient bank-
ruptcy are greater than the alternative costs of going through with the
bankruptcy, when secured parties are indifferent to the fact of, and
length of, a bankruptcy proceeding. So posed, the question of effi-
ciency becomes intensely empirical. Being empirical, we dare not say
anything a priori about the efficiency of a given postpetition interest
rule.
Thus, in asserting that bankruptcy courts would be deluged with
new business as a result of the majority's ruling, Judge Jones empha-
sizes the costs of these proceedings but says nothing about the bene-
fits. In particular, if bankruptcy is considered an efficient forum in
which to wind down insolvent estates, an incentive to forum shop
seems commendable. Thus, forum shopping is treated by Jones as if it
were an inherent evil, but nothing is an inherent evil to the law-and-
economics movement. Everything is judged by its instrumentality to
human preference. Forum shopping is an inherent evil to federalists
who fear that federal courts will displace the sovereignty of local
courts, but such concerns seem far removed from the context of bank-
ruptcy, where there seems little interest in preserving state court alter-
natives to bankruptcy proceedings.
D. Pseudo-Law-and-Economics
Representing the law-and-economics movement, after a fashion,
are Dean Thomas Jackson and Professor Douglas Baird, who have
made postpetition interest a cause cel~bre.168 Yet they are curiously
opaque about the normative basis upon which they argue. The goal of
the normative law-and-economics tradition is ordinarily to find the
efficient solution to any given legal question. In the welfare econom-
ics sense, efficiency means the greatest good for the greatest number
of people, usually as measured by wealth. Close attention to the
work of Baird and Jackson shows no such basis for their policy
recommendations.
Recall that wealth maximizing behavior of a firm is unambigu-
ously efficient in the welfare sense only if the firm imposes no net
external costs on others. Few firms are so inoffensive or inconsequen-
168. Jackson files amicus briefs on this question. See Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808
F.2d at 380 (dissenting opinion); Brief for Amicus Curiae, Thomas H. Jackson, pro se (Oct.
Term 1987) (Dock no. 86-1602); Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988);
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.),
734 F.2d 426, 435 n.10 (9th Cir. 1984).
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tial as to export no costs whatsoever. Therefore, anyone who talks
about optimal firm behavior is not talking efficiency, unless she also
means to deny that American business never exports costs to the pub-
lic-a foolish claim indeed. Jackson, and later Baird and Jackson
together, talk only about optimal firm behavior, even while hinting
that the global efficiency of such behavior is too difficult to assess. But
if optimal firm behavior is not necessarily efficient, what values are
served by maximizing the position of firms? Are firms "better" than
the entities who are harmed by firm maximization? It would appear
so,1 69 but Baird and Jackson give us no clue as to why this should be.
Jackson first broached these issues in his much cited article,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gain. 170 In this article, Jackson argues that bankruptcy rules should
be assessed according to whether abstract creditors, with attributes
chosen by Jackson, would unanimously agree to them. 17 1 For exam-
ple, Jackson establishes that general creditors would agree to be equal
in bankruptcy, in order to maximize the estate and reduce legal
costs. 172 Furthermore, Jackson shows that, if the existence of secured
credit as a medium of investment can help to maximize firm value,
then creditors would agree to allow bankruptcy to honor security
interests. This claim that everyone would gladly consent in advance is
tantamount to a claim that the value of the firm is maximized under
the consented-to rules. 73 Applied to postpetition interest, this "credi-
tor's bargain" implies that secured parties would veto a bankruptcy
proceeding that denies them postpetition interest; therefore, they
should receive it.
Now if security interests help to maximize firm value, then
awarding postpetition interest to undersecured parties might maxi-
169. I think that Baird and Jackson do believe that members of the firm are better in some
way than nonmembers of the firm who nevertheless bear the cost of firm behavior, although
they do not say why. They define the firm very clearly as the aggregate of claimants against
the firm, whether secured or unsecured creditors, or shareholders. Those without legal rights
against the firm do not count. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note
137, at 103 ("bankruptcy law is, and should be, concerned with the interests of those (from
bondholders to unpaid workers to tort victims to shareholders) who, outside of bankruptcy,
have property rights .... ").
170. See Jackson, supra note 156.
171. Id. at 907.
172. Id. at 865. This consent is based on the fact that Jackson assigns to hypothetical
creditors the condition of complete equality inter se. He then shows that equals will agree to
perpetuate equality-a truism. As it turns out, since the creditors are profit-maximizing
abstractions, his equally powerful creditors can be shown to agree on inequality, if they are
asked to, so long as every creditor is better off in bankruptcy than out of it. Carlson,
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1345-56 (1987) [hereinafter Carlson,
Philosophy in Bankruptcy].
173. Id. at 1356-57.
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mize firm value in marginal cases, assuming all sorts of other undis-
closed assumptions. 74 On the other hand, if security interests do not
necessarily maximize firm value, but allow the debtor to maximize its
own position instead, then refusing to grant postpetition interest to
undersecured parties tends to maximize firm value in marginal cases.
Jackson fails to mention this. In fact, Jackson fudges the question of
whether secured transactions increase firm value.1 75 But in doing so,
he disables himself from having anything useful to say about maxi-
mizing firm welfare, let alone total societal welfare. If Jackson could
assert that security interests help maximize firm welfare, then at least,
with a postpetition interest entitlement, we would have reached firm
optimizing behavior. Unhappily, we have not received even this
much from Jackson's work, let alone a plausible claim of welfare
efficiency.
In a later work, Jackson, with the assistance of Douglas Baird,
seems to renounce the very possibility of general welfare maximiza-
tion as a goal courts can follow.' 76 This is done for the refreshingly
candid reason that it is too hard for courts to decide the fate of a firm
on the basis of welfare efficiency. 17 7 Instead, Baird and Jackson make
an essentialist argument:' 78 the purpose of bankruptcy is to maximize
firm value (even when doing so is inefficient). This allows them to
claim (with some plausibility) that the challenging and difficult prob-
174. Such as, the bankruptcy rule in question is sufficiently important to lenders that they
will consider it when pricing their loans.
175. In an earlier article, Jackson claimed that security interests were efficient because
general creditors were better monitors of debtor behavior than secured creditors. Therefore, a
debtor's total interest expense could be reduced by assigning collateral to the poor monitors,
while the good monitors could extend unsecured credit. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1158-61 (1979).
This thesis was attacked by a fellow member of the law-and-economics movement.
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-14 (1981). Perhaps as a result of this attack Jackson chose to beg the
question concerning whether security interests are efficient. In fact it is a key assumption in
trying to identify firm-optimal legal entitlements.
176. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 137, at 102.
177. They write:
Fashioning remedies for all the harm a failing business may bring is difficult and
beyond the competence of a bankruptcy court .... Keeping a firm in one town
from closing may have the indirect effect of keeping a new one in a different town
from opening .... Instead of weighing these effects equally, a bankruptcy judge
is likely to focus on the demonstrable harms of those who are before him.
Id.
178. By "essentialist" argument, I mean an argument that rests upon the assertion of the
"true nature" of a socially contingent phenomenon. Such arguments, though disguised as
appeals to truth, are really intensely political appeals to temporary historical conditions. An
essentialist argument, especially when unacknowledged as such, is the surest sign of analytical
weakness.
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lem of externalities are "not bankruptcy problems. '1 79
For this reason, Baird and Jackson are not at all in the welfare
efficiency tradition of law-and-economics. Instead, we see Baird and
Jackson renouncing utilitarianism in favor of a system of posited Aris-
totelian essences. 8 ° In other words, Baird and Jackson attempt what
can only be called a medieval argument. The problem with essential-
ist argument is that it is difficult to prove that the essence is a fact in
the world. A positivist might accept an essence if it were "posited" by
the legislature, and if this is what Baird and Jackson mean, their
methodology might be persuasive at the level of legal formalism. But
where in the legislative history does it say that the purpose of bank-
ruptcy is to maximize "firm value," as they define it? It is quite possi-
ble to read statements to the effect that the purpose of bankruptcy is
to maximize the position of general creditors and to rehabilitate debt-
ors, 1 8 1 but general creditors and debtors are only part of the firm.
This essence suggests that bankruptcy trustees should steal from
secured creditors. To make their essentialism credible, Baird and
179. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 137, at 102. Baird and
Jackson are not always consistent in their view that externalities are not bankruptcy problems.
Not only should bankruptcy maximize the aggregate claims of each person in the firm, but the
legal costs of these parties, which are not always claims against the firms, should be minimized
as well. Recall that externalities of nonfirm members-harms that cannot be visited upon the
debtor through a lawsuit-are to be ignored because they are "not bankruptcy problems." But
externalities appended to those who have other, separate claims against the firm are to be
considered. They are bankruptcy problems. But on what basis can one distinguish the
external harms of firms members from the external harms of nonfirm members? The idea is
that only legally compensable claims should be maximized, and yet attorneys' fees are not
ordinarily legally compensable.
One of the things Baird and Jackson particularly emphasize is that bankruptcy courts
should slam the factory gates shut whenever firm value is enhanced. Id. at 102-03. But if we
can consider the nonlegal (external) harms of firm members-that is, if we can work to
minimize attorneys' fees for creditors-why can't we work to minimize the external harms of
workers who lose their jobs? They too are likely to be members of the firm because of wage or
pension claims and therefore ought to be eligible to append their nonlegal harms to the legal
claims.
180. They write:
Our view derives from two related observations: first, that bankruptcy law is,
and should be, concerned with the interests of those (from bondholders to unpaid
workers to tort victims to shareholders) who, outside of bankruptcy, have
property rights in the assets of the firm ... and second, that in analyzing the
interests of these parties with property rights, our baseline should be applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
Id. at 103. Recall that the definition of "firm value" is the aggregate value of all property
rights under state law.
181. In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1971) ("the Congressional mandate [is]
to encourage attempts at corporate reorganization when there is a reasonable possibility of
success").
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Jackson must exclude the alternative essences that might claim alle-
giance. This they never do.
Even assuming their ex cathedra essentialist program is correct,
the strong position of Baird and Jackson in favor of postpetition inter-
est still suffers from the internal contradiction that plagued Jackson's
solo work. Although postpetition interest would enhance the value of
a secured claim, they continue to beg the question of whether secured
credit enhances firm value. 18 2 Security interests might do the oppo-
site-they might allow debtors to grab wealth from general creditors
at the expense of total firm value. If this is true, then anything that
discourages secured credit maximizes firm value. Hence, under their
essentialist metaprinciple, they cannot tell us whether postpetition
interest for undersecured parties maximizes firm value, until they
resolve their feelings about the efficiency of security interests on firm
value.
It is possible to derive a tricky and subtle maneuver in the work
of Baird and Jackson that obviates the need to take a position on the
efficiency, or even firm maximizing quality, of secured credit. The
response is not expressly set forth, and it may represent my misread-
ing of their article. But here it is: Maximizing firm value is not bank-
ruptcy's most important metanorm. Even more important is the
principle that bankruptcy rules must never affect the world of state
law (even when firm value could be maximized by doing so). Bank-
ruptcy rules should be innocuous, impotent, harmless, and ineffectual.
Stated differently, bankruptcy rules should not maximize firm value
prior to the bankruptcy decision. It is more important that bank-
ruptcy be neutral. Meanwhile, given that a neutral bankruptcy law
exists, a metanorm of the second rank now insists that the postpeti-
tion firm's value be maximized. In other words, the role of bank-
ruptcy is to maximize the value of the wreckage (although it may not
prevent the wreckage in the first place).
Now, in light of this scrambled priority of essences, Baird and
Jackson can claim that bankruptcy should have no effect on the every-
day affairs of firm creation and investment policy. Instead, it must
have its effect on firms that have already failed. Under this restricted
view of firm maximization, it is irrelevant whether security interests
are nonmaximizing out of bankruptcy. So characterized, firm-max-
imization, as subordinated to bankruptcy neutrality, equates with the
182. "Our argument, then, does not rest on an assumption that secured credit, as it
currently exists under state law, is worth having." Baird & Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations, supra note 137, at 110-11.
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concern about forum shopping,"' an idea critiqued earlier. Note that
in asserting their transcendent essences, and subordinating firm max-
imization to them, Baird and Jackson are doubly removed from a wel-
fare economics argument. Under welfare maximization, the essences
(bankruptcy neutrality, and firm maximization) could not be sus-
tained unless they were welfare maximizing. For this reason, to avoid
confusion, it is better to term the views of Baird and Jackson as
''pseudo-law-and-economics"-a methodology that uses the jargon
but not the norms or the insights of welfare economics.
Even under this system in which bankruptcy neutrality is the
transcendent norm, it is far from clear that Baird and Jackson will
have maximized firm value by urging the adoption of a single rule that
appears to be neutral in the abstract. If the postpetition interest rule
were the only nonneutral bankruptcy rule that existed, then once we
neutralized that rule, the creditors would choose bankruptcy over the
alternatives only when the value of the insolvent firm would be maxi-
mized. The condition for such a world is as follows:
C, Cb
E, Eb
In this formula, C, is the creditor's expected return under state (or
nonbankruptcy) liquidation systems. Cb is the creditor's expected
return from a bankruptcy proceeding, while E, and Eb, respectively,
are the value of the entire estate in a state-law proceeding and in a
bankruptcy-law proceeding. For a truly neutral bankruptcy regime to
exist, the above formula would have to hold for each and every
creditor.
Not only is this condition impossible, but Baird and Jackson
themselves do not favor it. They write:
[B]ankruptcy law necessarily overrides the remedies of individual
investors outside of bankruptcy, for those "grab" rules undermine
the very advantages sought in a collective proceeding."8 4
Here, Baird and Jackson claim that treating general creditors equally
and taking away their judicial liens is required to maximize the aggre-
gate value of the firm. These rules that cut general creditors down to
size produce the same "incentives" that were denounced earlier when
they cut against secured parties. For example, those general creditors
183. "A rule change unrelated to the goals of bankruptcy creates incentives for particular
holders of rights in assets to resort to bankruptcy in order to gain, for themselves, the
advantages of that rule change, even though a bankruptcy proceeding was not in the collective
interest of the investor group." Id. at 104.
184. Id. at 100-01.
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who have received voidable preferences have an incentive to shun
bankruptcy, while those creditors who have not received their share
of voidable preferences have a nonneutral incentive to force the firm
into bankruptcy. Why don't these incentives lead to bad bankrupt-
cies, as did the ones that hurt secured parties?
The answer has to be that voidable preference law and the like
create nonneutral incentives for some general creditors to pursue
nonmaximizing bankruptcies. Given the nonneutrality of this rule,
the essences postulated by Baird and Jackson might dictate precisely
the opposite policy that they assert. That is, a nonneutral rule that
denies undersecured parties postpetition interest could be seen as a
good second-best strategy that moves bankruptcy law closer to the
stipulated goal of neutrality. In other words, general creditors who
lose their payments or their judicial liens because they are voidable
preferences are partially compensated by the chance to steal some
wealth from undersecured parties. Meanwhile, the general creditors
who never had preferences have a double incentive to seek bankruptcy
(even when not firm-maximizing), but they also have nonneutral dis-
incentives. In particular, general creditors do not receive postpetition
interest during the delay before reorganization or liquidation. An
increased bankruptcy estate, due to a rule against postpetition interest
for secured creditors, helps to compensate against this nonneutral dis-
entitlement. Furthermore, general creditors are at the mercy of bank-
ruptcy trustees, their lawyers, and accountants who are likely to take
value that general creditors might otherwise get. These counter-
vailing disincentives-each completely nonneutral in the abstract-
conceivably help to balance out the nonneutrality of a postpetition
interest rule for undersecured parties, although, as always, these are
empirical questions. Hence, asserting neutrality in a specific case
might be the equivalent of asserting nonneutrality generally, and
asserting nonneutral bankruptcy rules specifically might further the
goal of bankruptcy neutrality (assuming that this is a worthwhile
goal).
At the risk of turning this into a massacre, there is yet another
serious contradiction in the work of Baird and Jackson on postpeti-
tion interest. They claim strongly that, even if security interests are
bad or unfair, bankruptcy should do nothing about it. Otherwise, the
above incentives for bankruptcy are created. The new contradiction I
wish to illustrate is that, at the same time Baird and Jackson want
secured parties to get postpetition interest-in order to save the value
of their rights at state law-they also insist on equal treatment for
general creditors. General creditors are most unlikely to be equal
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under state law. They will differ in their power over the debtor and
the quickness with which they can obtain a judgment or other form of
payment. Why aren't general creditors entitled to their rights under
state law? Why should secured parties be protected, but not general
creditors? This contradiction is one Baird and Jackson share with
some of the other normative theories on postpetition interest-an
inability to distinguish between general creditors (who get no postpe-
tition interest) and undersecured parties (who do allegedly deserve it).
The inability to justify unequal treatment of secured and unsecured
creditors is the one problem that no writer has yet solved when deal-
ing with the ethics of postpetition interest entitlements.
V. NONECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR GIVING UNDERSECURED
CREDITORS POSTPETITION INTEREST
We have just seen that the economic argument for postpetition
interest is inconclusive. Assuming that postpetition interest is still
possible as a matter of judicial discretion, what kind of noneconomic
principles might be brought to bear? Two different views have been
located in the literature, and a line of cases already exists with regard
to discretion. Each, however, is flawed in one way or another.
The first of the academic views is founded upon the notion of
reciprocity-that is, since undersecured creditors are being deprived
of an entitlement, reciprocity demands that they be compensated. A
second view suggests that postpetition interest should be awarded in
cases in which the value of the collateral varies greatly (such as inven-
tory financing cases), but should not be awarded in cases in which the
collateral has a relatively stable value over time (such as equipment
cases). The crux of this claim seems to be that secured parties who
take risks by lending on floating collateral should be compensated for
having done so. In this Section, each of the academic views will be
considered. In addition, this Section will examine the norms
presented by courts in the discretionary interest cases.
A. Postpetition Interest as a Matter of Reciprocity
An early pitch that undersecured creditors should receive a
postpetition interest entitlement was made by Patrick Murphy, a law-
yer active in drafting some proposed replacements for the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. He justified the idea as follows:
This ... idea may seem shocking at first because it has been
long recognized in bankruptcy that a secured creditor is entitled to
the payment of interest only in the event that it holds surplus
security .... Nevertheless . .. [i]f the stay of the marginally
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secured creditor is properly viewed as an involuntary loan of prop-
erty to the debtor, there seems little reason not to afford the
secured creditor some protection against the ravages of inflation
and the fact that his own creditors have not given him an interest
moratorium.'85
So portrayed, the postpetition interest entitlement is a trade-off. The
debtor gets to use property characterized as belonging to the under-
secured creditor and therefore should be made to pay for it. Unfortu-
nately, general creditors, who get no postpetition interest, can make
the same argument. The debtor gets to use the money lent (or at least
not collected) by general creditors, and therefore the debtor should
pay interest for the use of that money. 86 Like the argument for ade-
quate protection presented in the legislative history,187 this argument
about postpetition interest fails to distinguish undersecured creditors
from general creditors. 8 ' Complete reciprocity in bankruptcy is out
of the question and must yield to concerns about equal treatment.
B. Risk Compensation
One of the more ambitious attempts at a theory of adequate pro-
tection comes from Professor Raymond Nimmer, 89 who discovered
that, in cases decided as of 1983, courts were more likely to award
postpetition interest as part of adequate protection when the collateral
was floating collateral, such as accounts or inventory, but not in cases
involving equipment.190 Based on this observation, Nimmer has filled
in a normative justification based on creditor expectations with regard
to risk undertaken. Interest is appropriate for inventory and accounts
because the risk of collateral depreciation is greater than for equip-
ment. '' Meanwhile, interest is not appropriate for equipment
185. Murphy, Use of Collateral in Business Rehabilitations. A Suggested Redrafting of
Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (1975); see also
United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 381 (5th Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988) ("An undersecured creditor... [who] has property at risk... is 'doing business' with
the debtor by virtue of a forced loan of his collateral.").
186. Anderson, Adequate Protection of Opportunity Cost after In re Briggs, 19 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 765, 778 (1986).
187. See supra text accompanying note 47.
188. It can be said that, in the absence of bankruptcy, the secured creditor has a property
claim, deprival of which demands compensation via interest, while the unsecured creditor does
not have a property claim until she obtains a judicial lien on the debtor's property. This is true
by definition. Nevertheless, both have acquiesced in the debtor's possession of personal
property, and both would have a similar claim to interest compensation.
189. See Nimmer, supra note 90.
190. Id. at 20-22, 25-35.
191. Nimmer writes:
[FIloating collateral cases routinely involve substantial reconstruction of the
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because it tends to have a more stable and predictable value over time
and hence less risk.
192
This concept of additional risk for accounts and inventory lend-
ing seems to be based on the idea that, with floating collateral, the
borrower is often invited to liquidate the collateral in the ordinary
course of business. 193 The risk is that since the borrower is allowed to
handle cash, he might divert it from the secured party. In addition,
inventory or accounts probably depreciate faster, generally speaking,
than equipment.
The problem with Nimmer's thesis is that the greater the risk of
the undersecured creditor, the more likely the undersecured creditor
will be rewarded with interest entitlements. Yet the more risky the
collateral, the more the undersecured creditor resembles general cred-
itors, who also take big risks. If general creditors are denied interest
because they have "trusted" the debtor by not reserving liens, then in
the interest of equal treatment, perhaps inventory lenders should be
denied postpetition interest as well. They "trust" the debtor with
cash proceeds of the collateral and therefore face an absence of collat-
eral, just like general creditors.
An additional problem with this thesis is that a prebankruptcy
risk taken by inventory and accounts lenders is used to justify a
postpetition entitlement. Yet in the postpetition period, the risk is
substantially transformed and perhaps eliminated. In other words,
prior to bankruptcy, inventory lenders might take a greater risk than
equipment lenders, but after bankruptcy, their fundamental right to
the value of the collateral is preserved and is entitled to be protected.
After bankruptcy, the collateral is extremely nonrisky. Why should
these inventory lenders have this risk removed and get postpetition
interest as well?
An adequate theory for a postpetition interest award needs to
show why undersecured creditors deserve postpetition interest, while
general creditors do not. Professor Nimmer argues that because
undersecured creditors claiming inventory face bigger risks than
undersecured creditors claiming equipment, the former deserve the
postpetition interest entitlement. But if high risk is the key factor,
why don't general creditors get interest entitlements also?
original bargain [between debtor and creditor], due in large part to a general
tendency on the part of courts to compensate for the extra risk encountered by
the creditor. Compensation commonly includes payment of interest on the
enforced investment and maintenance of at least some cash flow to the creditor.
Id. at 29.
192. Id. at 20.
193. Id. at 30.
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C. Normative Principles in the Case Law
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Timbers of Inwood For-
est, 194 several cases held that, as a matter of discretion, courts could
award postpetition interest to undersecured parties. The leading case
on discretionary awards of postpetition interest is In re Briggs Trans-
portation Co., 95 named by one writer as the case that "most closely
meets Congress's intent that courts use flexibility in determining ade-
quate protection." '96 For a discretionary doctrine to succeed the
courts must tell us when and why undersecured parties are entitled to
postpetition interest.
Briggs sacrifices guidance in favor of praise for the virtues of flex-
ibility, but it does provide one criterion: that creditor expectations
must be weighed against debtor expectations for a successful reorgani-
zation.' 97 An undersecured party should get postpetition interest
when it is highly probable that no Chapter 11 plan will be approved.
But she should not get postpetition interest when it is highly probable
that a Chapter 11 plan will be approved.' 98  This standard has the
virtue of prohibiting a marginal DIP from speculating at the expense
of undersecured parties.' 99 This can be viewed as an extension of the
principle found in Section 362(d)(2)(B)-that the trustee must not
retain collateral unless useful to a recorganization. 2°° Section
362(d)(2)(B) has no effect if the debtor also has equity in the collat-
eral.20 ' The Briggs principle therefore allows the court to consider the
viability of the firm, even when debtor equity exists to oust Section
194. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 108 S. Ct. 626 (1988).
195. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.),
780 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers (In re Ahlers),
794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 108 S. Ct. 963 (1988),
vacated and remanded, 844 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1988).
196. Carey, supra note 47, at 320.
197. This formulation once again tries, in a circular fashion, to deduce the law from
creditor expectations when creditors in fact expect the protection the law gives them. Yet the
existence or prelegal expectations is impossible to show or prove. See In re All-Ways Servs.,
Inc., 73 Bankr. 556, 575 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (emphasizing that creditors must show they
relied on their contractual right to receive interest compensation).
198. Id. at 1349.
199. Carey, supra note 47, at 339. This would be so even if actual payment of the interest is
deferred until the plan is confirmed. Briggs, 780 F.2d at 1348 (approving the idea of deferring
interest payments). A DIP must still have the funds to make sure that all dissenting creditors
receive as much in the plan as they would have received in a hypothetical liquidation. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). To the extent undersecured parties have extra
entitlements, this goal will be harder to achieve, no matter when the payments to the
undersecured parties are actually made.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
201. Id.
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362(d)(2)(B) from jurisdiction.20 2
Besides Briggs, several other cases deserve mention.2 °3 Some
cases asserted that the pressure on banks carrying unproductive loans
was a reason to lift the stay, though not to award periodic interest, 2°4
but these cases also balanced debtor interests against creditor interests
in determining whether to lift the stay.2 °5 Similarly, in In re
Colrud,2 °6 an undersecured party was himself close to liquidation. He
asked for a postpetition interest award on the grounds that it was
necessary to stave off his own financial ruin. The bankruptcy court
granted it based on this grounds, suggesting that the postpetition
interest entitlement belongs to poor creditors but not to rich ones.20 7
To conclude, if it is true that a court has discretion to award
postpetition interest as part of adequate protection, the ethical
grounds for doing so has not been developed very well. This failure
plagues the entire issue both in the courts and in the academic com-
mentary. Perhaps a reason can be proffered for this. Postpetition
interest vel non amounts to a property entitlement or disentitlement,
and an ethical theory must be able to tell us who deserves to be
enriched and who deserves to be impoverished. Perhaps a deeply con-
202. Of course, Justice Scalia would say this counts as an argument against Briggs. It will be
remembered that he based one of his main arguments for no postpetition interest entitlements
for undersecured parties on preserving the necessity of Section 362(d)(2). United Say. Ass'n of
Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 108 S. Ct.
626, 627 (1988). The Briggs court may have erred in making adequate protection too
adequate!
203. One court was skeptical as to whether any grounds for discretionary interest payments
could be developed: "This court does not believe that lost opportunity cost is always required
for adequate protection. Indeed, the payment... should rarely be required, if ever. The court
sees no special circumstances in this case that call for the payment .... " Parker v. Concorde
Ltd. Partnership (In re Concorde Ltd. Partnership), 67 Bankr. 717, 723-24 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1986). In this case, however, the junior mortgagee had some equity cushion, but apparently
wanted cash payments, not accrual over time. Id. at 724-25.
204. See In re C.F. Simonin's Sons, Inc., 28 Bankr. 707, 713 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983);
Commonwealth of Pa. School Employees' Retirement Fund v. Heath (In re Heath), 9 Bankr.
665, 668-69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
205. City Nat'l. Bank v. San Clemente Estates (In re San Clemente Estates), 5 Bankr. 605,
611 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (stay not lifted because debtor sincere); cf Fidelity Bond and
Mortgage Co. v. Britton (In re Britton), 9 Bankr. 245, 248 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (stay lifted
because debtor insincere).
206. 45 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1984).
207. Id. at 179-81; see also In re McDaniel, 89 Bankr. 861, 877-78 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1988) (since creditors required "income" from real estate mortgage, monthly payments were
granted, but no guidance given as to whether payments are on principal or interest); Yaffe,
M.D. v. Andrews (In re Andrews), 17 Bankr. 515, 518-19 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982) (relief from
automatic stay granted in case in which debtor acted in bad faith and failed to pay, almost
causing creditor financial ruin). Contra Neier v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. (In re Apex Oil
Co.), 85 Bankr. 538, 541 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988) (erroneously claiming no cases exist to
support such a proposition).
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textual case-by-case analysis can reveal the answer to this question,
but such questions of who gets what cannot very easily be disposed of
at a high level of abstraction. As a result, nothing much can be said in
general about when a secured party should receive postpetition inter-
est by way of adequate protection.
VI. OVERSECURED PARTIES AND POSTPETITION INTEREST
Up to this point, we have been examining the issue of whether
undersecured parties may obtain postpetition interest under the guise
of adequate protection, a question which the Supreme Court has
answered in the negative. It should not be assumed, however, that
Timbers of Inwood Forest has no application to oversecured parties.2"8
On the contrary, Section 506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which... is greater than the amount of such claim [i.e,
a collateral cushion exists], there shall be allowed to the holder of
such claim, interest on such claim . .2. 9
The postpetition interest entitlements described in Section 506(b)
are susceptible to two different readings. Under the first reading, if a
collateral cushion exists, then the secured party receives full interest
on her claim. In other words, the cushion is simply a necessary condi-
tion precedent to postpetition interest but is not a limit on the amount
of interest that can be collected. Under the second reading, if a collat-
eral cushion exists, then the secured party gets full interest on her
claim, but the cushion itself limits the amount of interest that the
secured party can receive. To illustrate, suppose collateral is worth
$1,100, and a secured party is entitled to 10% on a claim of $1,000.
Under the first reading, the oversecured party can get 10% in
perpetuity because the condition precedent of an equity cushion at the
beginning of the bankruptcy has been met. Under the second reading,
the oversecured party can get one year's worth of interest. If the
bankruptcy proceeding lasts into the second year, then no further
interest can be paid.
208. Courts routinely use equity cushions as the device of adequate protection without
considering the effect of such use on the postpetition interest entitlement of the oversecured
party. E.g., Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y (In re Sun Valley
Ranches, Inc.), 823 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986). The omitted words make clear that the collateral
cushion should be calculated only after the trustee has deducted from the collateral fund any
"necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any
benefit to the holder of such claim." 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982). Other omitted words also give
secured parties the "fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement," to the extent of
the collateral cushion. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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In Timbers of Inwood Forest, the Supreme Court endorsed this
second reading,2"' which means that, if a bankruptcy proceeding lasts
long enough, then all oversecured parties will eventually become
undersecured parties.21 With this reading of Section 506(b) in effect,
Timbers of Inwood Forest will govern the interest entitlements of
undersecured and oversecured parties alike. The contradictions
between oversecured and undersecured parties will be avoided only
when the equity cushion is so large that no bankruptcy proceeding
could possibly take long enough for postpetition interest to erode the
cushion.
Although the Supreme Court has endorsed the second view of
Section 506(b)-wherein the equity cushion is the limit of postpetition
interest entitlements, lower courts have in fact taken both views of
Section 506(b)-the "conditional" view and the "limitation" view. In
other words, sometimes secured parties receive unlimited bankruptcy
interest, so long as there is some equity cushion when the bankruptcy
proceeding started, and sometimes the cushion serves as the limit of
interest dollars an oversecured party can receive. The fact that courts
have split on this issue is not usually recognized because courts have
reached these results obliquely through technical manipulations of the
adequate protection doctrine.
Neither reading-of Section 506(b) is free from unpleasant side
effects. If the equity cushion is viewed to be the condition but not the
limit of postpetition interest for the oversecured party, then secured
parties with a one dollar equity cushion get full postpetition interest,
while creditors with a one dollar deficiency get no postpetition inter-
est. This state of affairs appears highly arbitrary. On the other hand,
if the equity cushion is viewed as the limit of how much interest an
oversecured party can get, then terrible confusion is created by the
fact that the equity cushion simultaneously becomes both the measure
of the secured party's entitlement and the device by which adequate
protection is assured.
What follows is an account of all the logical permutations of the
conflict between adequate protection and postpetition interest entitle-
ments for oversecured parties. We start with the simplest case.
210. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 108 S. Ct. 626, 631 (1988) ("[T]his provision permits postpetition
interest to be paid only out of the 'security cushion'.... ).
211. Or, to be more precise, at least they would be on the borderline between being
oversecured and undersecured and no longer entitled to postpetition interest.
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A. Extremely Large Equity Cushions
Every oversecured creditor is potentially an undersecured credi-
tor if (a) the equity cushion is a limit on the postpetition interest enti-
tlement, and (b) the bankruptcy proceeding lasts long enough. But
sometimes an equity cushion is so large that no oversecured creditor
is likely to become undersecured through the accrual of interest. If
so, the ambiguity of Section 506(b)-whether debtor equity is a condi-
tion or a limitation-may be avoided altogether.212
The following schematic drawing illustrates this and subsequent
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dollars today. The right ordinate represents the face amount of dol-
lars at the time the bankruptcy proceeding is expected to be con-
cluded. The abscissa represents time.
For ease of illustration, we assume that one year is the time the
bankruptcy proceeding is expected to take. At the time of bank-
212. For some cases with equity cushions large enough to avoid the meaning of section
506(b), see In re Grant Broadcasting of Philadelphia, Inc., 71 Bankr. 376, 386 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 75 Bankr. 819 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 Bankr. 784, 795
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (equating size of cushion with prospective accrual of interest); Parker v.
Concorde Ltd. Partnership (In re Concorde Ltd. Partnership), 67 Bankr. 717, 724-25 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1986); Peninsula Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. R & H Investment Co. (In re R & H
Investment Co.), 46 Bankr. 114, 116 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
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ruptcy, the value of the collateral is expected to be $10. One year
from bankruptcy, the value of the collateral is expected to remain at
$10. The oversecured party has a claim of $9 and is entitled to 10%
interest, so that, in a year, the secured party will have a claim of
$9.90. We assume for the moment that the oversecured party is not
paid cash. Instead, interest is allowed to accrue against the debtor's
shrinking equity. Compound interest is not allowed in bankruptcy,213
so the secured party can get only a straight 10% on the principal.
In such a case, a court need not choose between the two interpre-
tations of Section 506(b) because the collateral travels from point A to
point E-a horizontal line at $10- while the amount of the secured
claim goes from B to D. On the right ordinate, CZ represents the
principal amount of the secured party's claim, while CD represents
postpetition interest. Together, DZ represents the oversecured party's
allowable claim at the time the reorganization plan takes effect.
It can be seen that postpetition interest depletes the bankrupt
estate. Retaining the collateral is rational only if the estate can earn
more than the expense of retention. Line segment EG represents the
expense of retention. EF represents the amount of interest paid to the
oversecured party. FG represents the amount the estate could have
earned if it had liquidated the collateral immediately, paid $9 to the
secured party, and invested the equity cushion according to its best
alternative opportunity. For retention to make sense, the estate will
have to earn revenues in excess of EG.
B. Same: Interest Paid Periodically
Section 506(b) hints that a trustee might refuse to pay the over-
secured party postpetition interest in cash, and instead allow the
interest to accrue, so that the size of the secured claim grows. 2 14 In
Figure 1, this is shown by line BD. If instead the court insists that the
trustee must pay interest from time to time in lieu of accrual, then the
amount of interest the oversecured party receives increases (and the
expense of retention also increases). This is because, in bankruptcy,
compounded interest cannot be awarded. If interest is actually paid
out, however, the secured party can reinvest the payments and earn
compound interest. A court order requiring periodic payment of
interest prior to confirmation of the plan therefore has the effect
shown in Figure 2. The return to the oversecured party shifts upwards
from BD to BD' Accordingly, the cost of retention shifts from AG to
AG', where DD' = EF'. Notice that the oversecured party obtains
213. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
214. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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FIGURE 2
postpetition interest entitlements that are higher than the equity cush-
ion. In other words, CD' > CE. This is unobjectionable. The total
dollars paid out (unadjusted for time value) is represented by CD.
This amount does not exceed the equity cushion, so that a court is not
required to choose between the two interpretations of Section 506(b).
Nevertheless, the periodic payment of interest is more expensive for
the bankruptcy estate than the accrual of interest because periodic
payouts deprive the bankrupt estate of an investment opportunity.
C. Depreciating Collateral and Periodic Payout of Interest
Figure 3 already introduces a paradox. In this case, the collat-
eral depreciates in value from $10 to $9.10. The oversecured party is
entitled to 10% interest. This is paid out periodically, so that the
oversecured party earns compound interest, represented by BD'. If
interest is accrued instead of paid out, the secured party would have
gotten BD, for a total interest entitlement that is less than the initial
equity cushion of the debtor (DC < AB). 21 5
215. Cases following this approach include Tokai Bank of Cal. v. Old Town Historic Bldg.
Ltd. Partnership (In re Old Town Historic Bldg. Ltd. Partnership), 79 Bankr. 8, 11 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1987) (with no depreciation proven, interest payments to thinly secured creditor
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Notice that after point Y in time, the equity cushion has declined
below the amount of interest dollars actually paid out. Now the court
is forced to choose between the two readings of Section 506(b). Fig-
ure 3 shows continued periodic payout of interest, in lieu of accrual,
for the entire bankruptcy proceeding. This plan is permissible under
the following conditions: (a) Section 506(b) does not make the equity
cushion the limit of the oversecured party's interest entitlement;216 or
alternatively, (b)(i) the cushion may or may not be the limit, but (ii)
adequate protection provides an independent ground for awarding
postpetition interest to the oversecured party.217 Of course, Timbers
awarded as adequate protection); In re Wilson, 70 Bankr. 46 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987); In re
Noyes, 62 Bankr. i115, 117 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) (both interest and payments covering
depreciation awarded); United States v. Smithfield Estates, Inc. (In re Smithfield Estates, Inc.),
48 Bankr. 910, 915 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) (in light of thin equity, debtor ordered to pay interest
and principal per contract); In re Sheehan, 38 Bankr. 859, 865 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1984) (interest
paid out on thin equity cushion); Sun Bank/Suncoast v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite,
Inc.), 9 Bankr. 440, 444 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (debtor not permitted to allow cushion to
depreciate, because that would adversely affect the oversecured party's right to postpetition
interest).
216. One case so holding is In re Ritz Theatres, Inc., 68 Bankr. 256, 259-60 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1987) (awarding interest in excess of the equity cushion). Interestingly, the Ritz court also
rejected postpetition interest entitlements for undersecured parties, even though it awarded
interest to oversecured parties in excess of the limit of debtor equity. Id. at 260.
217. Northern Trust Co. v. Leavell (In re Leavell), 56 Bankr. 11, 14 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1985);
In re Becker, 51 Bankr. 975 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). In Becker, the secured party and the
debtor agreed upon a schedule of payments by way of adequate protection. The debtor
defaulted on these payments, and the stay was lifted. In the eventual foreclosure sale, the
secured party failed to get the value predicted by the bankruptcy court. The secured party
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of In wood Forest might rule out alternative (b)(ii).218 Thus, any post-
Timbers court following the plan in Figure 3 takes a position on the
meaning of Section 506(b): The cushion is the condition, but not the
limit, of the postpetition interest entitlement.
In Figure 3, the secured party is oversecured between time X and
Y. She is undersecured between times Y and Z. For courts wishing to
establish the equity cushion as the limit of interest for the oversecured
party, periodic interest can be paid until point Y, but not after then.
The effect of such a ruling is shown in Figure 4. After point Y, a
court will have to terminate periodic interest payments to the secured
party who is now undersecured. Line BD.' therefore flattens out to
represent the termination of the interest payments. Because interest
was paid prior to time Y, the secured party will continue to get some
benefit from compounding. Therefore, after time Y, BD" is positively
sloped.
The collateral is depreciating, so that after point Y, the secured
party is entitled to have the automatic stay lifted. To prevent this, the
trustee can award additional collateral to the secured party, starting
at point Y. This extra collateral is represented by E'D "'. The total
scheme's effect on income is beneficial to the debtor. The needed
income to justify retention of the collateral levels out from G' to G".
Figure 4 assumes that, after point Y, adequate protection is sup-
plied through additional collateral. Many courts approve adequate
protection in the form of cash payments equal to depreciation
(E'D '"). In Figure 4, this ruling shifts BD" further upwards because
it is possible for the secured party to invest cash actually paid out and
obtain a form of compound interest.
To summarize, Figure 4 illustrates the problems caused when the
equity Cushion is simultaneously the mode of adequate protection and
the limit of the oversecured party's postpetition interest entitlement.
In order to solve the paradox, one must take the view that the equity
cushion is not the limit of the undersecured party's postpetition inter-
est entitlement, or that interest entitlements run out at point Y. Alter-
natively, one could also decide that the secured party has the right to
therefore requested, as a remedy, a superpriority under Bankruptcy Code section 507(b). The
court allowed the secured party to add what appears to be full postpetition interest to the
superpriority claim, even though that interest must have far exceeded the tiny equity cushion
that existed at the start of the bankruptcy proceeding. But the court indicated that it would
have allowed undersecured creditors to do the same for the interest on the secured portion of
their claims. Id. at 979 n.5.
218. It will be recalled that Timbers of Inwood Forest may simply rule out an automatic
right to postpetition interest for undersecured parties. 108 S. Ct. at 635. If discretionary
postpetition interest is still permitted, that alternative (b)(ii) is not ruled out.
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reserve the debtor's equity in collateral for the accrual of future inter-
est, so that, even though the collateral is depreciating, the under-
secured party may always have up to (but no more than) the equity
that exsted at the start of the bankruptcy proceeding (AB). This last
possiblity will be explored later on. 19
D. Depreciating Collateral and Cash Payments for Depreciation
Figure 5 represents a case in which the collateral is expected to
depreciate below the amount of the secured party's allowed claim.
Thus, the secured party starts out oversecured at AX, but she ends up
undersecured at E*Z. This depreciation requires that the trustee sup-
ply compensation as part of adequate protection. If additional collat-
eral is supplied, the secured party's total entitlements will amount to
D*Z. If cash payments are required to compensate for deprecia-
tion,22° the secured party's allowed claim shrinks to E*Z, but she has
219. See infra text accompanying notes 226-35.
220. The cash payments representing depreciation should be deemed in satisfaction of the
allowed secured claim. But see Mitchell v. Frankford Trust Co. (In re Mitchell), 75 Bankr.
593, 597 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). In Mitchell, the mortgaged premises were damaged in a fire.
Id. The insurance company covered part of the loss, which, under Pennsylvania law, belonged
to the mortgagee. Id. The court should have ruled that the oversecured party had a security
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FIGURE 5
also received E*D* in periodic cash payments. This cash can be rein-
vested by the secured party, so that the total value of her bankruptcy
entitlements is D**Z.
E. Plans that Preserve the Existence of Equity
One kind of adequate protection scheme for oversecured parties
is represented by Figure 6. In this scheme, the court orders cash pay-
ments to compensate for depreciation (EE*). For undersecured par-
ties, this adequate protection is uncontroversial. 221  But when the
secured party has an equity cushion, depreciation payments preserve
for the secured party the same amount of equity cushion that existed
at the start of the bankruptcy proceeding (AB = C*E*). Meanwhile,
interest on the declining principal is paid in cash as well (C*D).
Because the secured party can reinvest the cash actually received, the
package of entitlements is worth D 'Z to her. This plan is designed to
interest in this fund, but instead it ruled that the unsecured deficit of the creditor should be
reduced, not the secured claim, on the theory that the debtor should not profit from
postpetition fires. Id. Clearly, payments as a means of adequate protection ought to reduce
only the secured claim. Payments on the unsecured claim are preferential.
221. "The Code itself, the legislative history, and the numerous cases interpreting the same
are fairly harmonious in requiring adequate protection payments by the debtor for the decrease
in the value of the collateral arising out of the use thereof by the debtor." Greives v. Bank of
Western Ind. (In re Greives), 81 Bankr. 912, 961 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
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guarantee that the value of the secured claim at the start of the bank-
ruptcy (BX) is preserved at the end of the bankruptcy (D 'Z). 222
If Section 506(b) is interpreted according to the "limitation"
view, this plan violates the rule in Timbers of Inwood Forest. After
point Y, it provides an undersecured party with postpetition interest.
In order to comply, a bankruptcy court will have to find a way to
flatten out BD' after point Y. 223
222. On the assumption that undersecured parties are entitled to postpetition interest as
part of adequate protection, two decisions have noted that oversecured creditors eventually
become undersecured, if the bankruptcy proceeding lasts long enough. Albion Prod. Credit
Assoc. v. Langley (In re Langley), 30 Bankr. 595, 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983); In re Schaller,
27 Bankr. 959, 962 (W.D. Wis. 1983). These opinions therefore require adequate protection of
any equity cushion of an oversecured party, no matter how large the cushion. This also seems
to be the import of In re Hagendorfer, 42 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1984):
The value of the secured party's lien, or interest, can be determined by
comparing the amount of the debt, principal, and accrued interest, any costs and
expenses incurred in protecting that interest as allowed by the instrument, and
the increase or decline in value of the property held as security. If the value of
the lien has decreased following the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the
secured creditor is entitled to protection, even if there is sufficient equity to pay
the indebtedness in full on foreclosure or liquidation.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added). The italicized words hint that the point is to protect a specific
equity cushion over time. Elsewhere in the Hagendorfer opinion, the judge emphasizes that
the existence of the equity cushion cannot be adequate protection itself. I take this to mean
that the court thinks that the equity cusion is the end and not the means of adequate
protection.
223. Some courts have required a constant, noneroding debtor equity over time, but they
did so on the assumption that, after the equity cushion eroded, the now undersecured party
could have postpetition interest as a matter of adequate protection. In re Liona Corp., N.V., 68
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One possible solution would be to provide for payments on inter-
est up to point Y (CD *) and payments on depreciation (CC*) after
point Y. Before point Y, interest is paid out periodically, but after
point Y, BD* levels out. In other words, the court will revert to Fig-
ure 5.
F. Lifting the Stay
Another scheme that might award postpetition interest to soon-
to-be undersecured parties is for the court simply to lift the automatic
stay, so that the secured party can obtain the collateral outside of
bankruptcy. This ruling would allow the secured party to get postpe-
tition interest because the secured party can foreclose, obtain cash
proceeds, and reinvest them. When the stay is lifted specifically to
guarantee postpetition interest to a secured party, the court implicitly
includes the right to postpetition interest in its view of adequate pro-
tection.224 Therefore, lifting the stay for this reason might violate the
principles of Timbers of Inwood Forest.225
G. The Secured Party's Right to the Debtor's Equity
It has been suggested that the use of the debtor's equity both as
the measure of a secured party's entitlement to postpetition interest
and as the means of adequate protection poses a contradiction. One
way a court can reconcile a limited-liability concept of Section 506(b)
Bankr. 761, 767-68 & n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Park West Hotel Corp., 64 Bankr.
1013, 1022-23 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); see Heritage Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Rogers Dev. Corp.
(In re Rogers Dev. Corp.), 2 Bankr. 679, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (court thought the
increasing value of collateral would protect the ongoing right to postpetition interest).
These cases are no longer tenable after Timbers of Inwood Forest, unless Section 506(b) is
read in the "conditional," not the "limitation," manner. In other words, if oversecured parties
can receive interest indefinitely, so long as there is one dollar of equity at the start of the
bankruptcy proceeding, these cases do not violate the rule of Timbers of Inwood Forest. It
must be recalled, however, that, in dictum, the Supreme Court has read Section 506(b) in the
"limitation" fashion. 108 S. Ct. at 631-32.
224. E.g., First Agricultural Bank v. Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc. (In re Jug End in the
Berkshires), 46 Bankr. 892, 899-900 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (equity inadequate to cover
anticipated interest accrual); In re Woodbranch Energy Plaza One, Ltd., 44 Bankr. 733, 737
(Bankr. S.D. Texas 1984) (where equity was thin, accruing interest and declining trend in real
estate market justified lifting the stay); GECC Fin. Corp. v. Bandy (In re Bandy), 39 Bankr.
673, 675 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1982); Ukrainian Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Trident Corp. (In re Trident
Corp.), 19 Bankr. 956, 958 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Lincoln Bank v. High Sky, Inc. (In re High
Sky, Inc.), 15 Bankr. 332, 338 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981) (stay lifted because interest was
accruing, the collateral was not appreciating in value, and no other protection offered); In re H
& F Inv. Co., 9 Bankr. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (same); In re Stuart Motel, Inc., 8 Bankr.
50 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (same); Vlahos v. Pitts (In re Pitts), 2 Bankr. 476, 479 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1979) (threatening to lift stay if interest accrual destroys equity cushion).
225. 108 S. Ct. at 633.
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and the use of cushions to protect against depreciation is to estimate
the length of the bankruptcy proceeding, calculate postpetition inter-
est for oversecured creditors, and then treat the secured claim as if it
were for that augmented amount. If the collateral depreciates below
this projected amount, then the court can either lift the stay or require
some supplementary protection.226 In so doing, it would not actually
be awarding unaccrued interest to the oversecured parties. Rather the
court would simply be protecting the oversecured parties' rights
under Section 506(b), in order to utilize the equity cushion for postpe-
tition interest as it eventually accrues. Meanwhile, the equity cushion
that actually existed at the time dictated by valuation constitutes the
limit of postpetition interest an undersecured party can get.
A middle view-less favorable to secured parties-is that collat-
eral for anticipated postpetition interest need not be set aside for
secured parties. The debtor's equity is property of the estate, and as
such, may be used at any time for the benefit of the estate, even if the
use interferes with the future accrual of interest.227 But the trustee
must never invade the collateral needed to support accrued postpeti-
tion interest. In Figure 4, for example, the trustee must let postpeti-
tion accrue until point Y, the time at which use of the collateral finally
interferes with the secured party's right to collateral. Thereafter, the
226. One case that used this technique was Hamilton Bank v. Diaconx Corp. (In re
Diaconx Corp.), 69 Bankr. 333, 339 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). However, it was not interest that
was anticipated, but attorneys' fees and collection expenses to which the secured party was
entitled under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, the principle can be used
analogously for postpetition interest as well.
227. Such a set of beliefs authorizes the DIP to expropriate the surplus without regard to
the secured party's right to save the collateral for future unaccrued postpetition interest. This
right of expropriation also means that the DIP can take proceeds without providing the
(over)secured party with adequate protection. See In re Triplett, 87 Bankr. 25, 27 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1988) (where equity cushion existed, secured party had no right to complain that
the DIP was using cash collateral).
Chapter 11 also authorizes the seizure of the debtor's equity away from the secured party,
because the Chapter 11 plan need only provide secured parties with the "indubitable
equivalent" of their state law rights. 11 U.S.C. 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). That is, the power to
expropriate the surplus under the adequate protection doctrine and under the plan appears to
be the same. But new Chapter 12 breaks this correlation. Under a Chapter 12 plan, where a
secured party dissents, either the collateral must be abandoned to the secured party, or the
secured party must retain "the lien securing such claim .... " Id. § 1225(1)(5). At least one
court has commented:
Read literally, Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(i), which requires that a secured creditor
retain its lien, would preclude reorganization when an oversecured creditor has a
lien in all property of the estate since the collateral could not be sold and the
debtor could not use its equity in the property to finance its reorganization.
In re Underwood, 87 Bankr. 594, 597 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988). Finding such a lack of flexibility
absurd and necessary, the court simply read the adequate protection standards into section
1225(a)(5), thereby reestablishing the parallelism between Chapter 11, Chapter 12 and pre-
plan adequate protection doctrines with regard to exploitation of the debtor surplus.
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trustee must protect the secured party for at least the amount of
D 'Z. It will be noted that the first idea protected the secured party
for BD, where D > D"'.
A third view is the least favorable to secured parties. Pending a
sale of collateral or confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan, an oversecured
party is not entitled to adequate protection for postpetition interest-
only prepetition interest and principal are to be protected. The
secured party therefore could be deprived of postpetition interest that
has already accrued against an existing equity cushion, so long as the
oversecured party's principal was not invaded.228 Meanwhile, if, at
the time of sale or confirmation, the collateral's value exceeded the
amount of the claim at the time of the bankruptcy petition, then the
oversecured party could obtain an award of postpetition interest. The
consequence of this view is that, even if it means a loss of already
accrued postpetition interest, an oversecured party has no right to
complain about a shrinking equity cushion. Under this view, over-
secured parties are not entitled to adequate protection for their fully
allowed secured claims.
This view-no right to adequate protection for any kind of
postpetition interest entitlement-is arguably an accurate portrayal of
the prevailing attitude under the 1898 Act. The old Act simply did
not provide a right to adequate protection. Instead, the secured party
simply hoped that the value of the collateral did not deteriorate over
time.229 This absence of right was tempered by the practice of lifting
the stay in bankruptcy if the secured party claimed the stay to be
prejudicial. Such a request, however, was within the discretion of the
court to deny. If the court lifted the stay, then the secured party
could obtain a form of postpetition interest by obtaining and reinvest-
ing cash proceeds from a nonbankruptcy sale of the collateral.23 °
Therefore, this interpretation of the secured party's right to anticipate
the existence of the debtor's equity at the end of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is only half-supported by the history of the old Act.
Whether the trustee can interfere with the secured party's future
enjoyment of the debtor's equity is especially important if the trustee
228. This view is forcefully presented in O'Toole, supra note 12, at 267, 270-72, 274. It has
been followed in McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n. (In re McCombs
Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 Bankr. 261 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re National Computer Comm.
Corp., 85 Bankr. 6 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988).
229. See supra text accompanying notes 15-25.
230. This view was taken for granted as true by Judge King in United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380,
1407-08 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 626
(1988).
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wants to obtain new credit and wants to use the debtor's equity as
collateral. In other words, the trustee would like to give a second or
even a first security interest on the collateral to obtain the new loan.23'
How much of this debtor equity belongs to the prior secured party,
and how much of it belongs to the bankrupt's estate? On the first
view, the secured party is entitled to DZ (of Figure 4) at the end of the
bankruptcy. In such a case, only DE can be used to secure the new
loan, no matter when the new loan is obtained. Under the second
view, the trustee cannot invade the collateral needed to secure
accrued interest claims. Thus, at time X, AB is available to secure
new loans. This amount shrinks until it disappears at time Y, when
no debtor equity remains for this purpose. Finally, under the third
view, the entire AB is available to the estate, no matter when the new
loan is obtained, in which case, by getting a new loan, the trustee can
eliminate an oversecured party's entire right to postpetition interest.
These contradictory views require us to determine whether
secured parties have the right to preserve the debtor's equity in collat-
eral for anticipated interest accrual (and, for that matter, anticipated
legal expenses that the secured party can charge against the
collateral).232
At state law, the matter is very uncertain. Under Article 9 of the
UCC, one court has held that judicial lien creditors could not levy
property that senior secured parties needed to cover future unaccrued
interest and future collection expenses.23 3 If this authority is adopted
(through the idea that a bankruptcy trustee is a hypothetical judicial
lien creditor), then the debtor's equity belongs to the secured party,
and a trustee may do nothing to interfere with any debtor equity
existing at the beginning of a bankruptcy proceeding that a secured
party might need to secure claims for future interest. The idea that
Article 9 preserves collateral for unaccrued interest, however, is quite
questionable if one pays close attention to the text Of Article 9. The
opposite seems to be the better view-that the attachment of a judicial
lien stops all further interest from accruing.234
And yet, if debtor equity is totally unavailable to secured parties
231. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2) (1982) (authorizing superpriority for new credit if old secured
parties are adequately protected from senior lien).
232. This latter feature is also supplied to oversecured parties under Section 506(b). 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Although the right of oversecured parties to postpetition
attorneys' fees is beyond the scope of this Article, much of what is said about postpetition
interest will also apply to postpetition collection expenses.
233. Dick Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 746 F,2d 126 (2d
Cir. 1984).
234. See Schroeder & Carlson, Future Nonadvance Obligations Under Article 9 of the UCC:
Legitimate Priority or Unwarranted Squeeze-Out?, 102 BANKING L.J. 412, 434 (1985).
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to cover the expected future accrual of interest, then one might ask
why Congress bothered to write in Section 506(b) that oversecured
parties could have postpetition interest, given that the bankruptcy
trustee can immediately deprive the secured party of the opportunity
to receive future bankruptcy interest, simply by issuing a superpri-
ority lien for the existing debtor equity.235 The best available answer
follows the second, middle view: Congress intended to let the bank-
ruptcy trustee use available debtor equity immediately for the benefit
of the estate, but the trustee must not invade any equity needed to
secure any postpetition interest that has already accrued.
H. Multiple Security Interests
These rules for postpetition interest-whether the equity cushion
does or does not constitute the limit on the interest an oversecured
party can get-should not be confused with the right of a junior
secured party to be protected against the accrual of senior interest.
Up to now, it has been assumed that a single security interest encum-
bered a piece of collateral. Suppose, however, that there are multiple
security interests encumbering the collateral. The senior secured
party remains senior with regard to postpetition interest.236 There-
fore, if the collateral cushion is insufficient to sustain the accruing
postpetition interest claims of both parties, then the senior creditor
displaces the junior, and the junior becomes undersecured. Similarly,
if there is no equity cushion at all (from the perspective of both
secured parties), then the part of collateral that belongs to the junior
secured party is in fact the equity cushion for the senior secured
party.237 In other words, as interest accrues on the senior claim, the
junior party is displaced.
The leading pre-Code case on this conflict is Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co. 2 38 In
Reconstruction Finance Corp., assets existed at the time of the bank-
ruptcy filing in 1935 to pay off the senior secured parties and the jun-
ior secured parties in full.239 The railroad, under judicial protection,
made a great deal of money profiteering off World War II. None of
this money was used to pay interest to the senior creditors.2"
235. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
236. Under Article 9, the first party to perfect or file a financing statement has a seniority
that clearly extends to interest. UCC § 9-312(5)(a).
237. Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 F.2d 1396, 1400-02 (9th Cir. 1984).
238. 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
239. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Insurance Group Comm. (In re Denver & R.G.W.R.R.),
150 F.2d 28, 38 (10th Cir. 1945).
240. Id. at 35.
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Instead, it was used to undo the damage caused by deferred mainte-
nance. This investment apparently did increase the value of the col-
lateral, but the increase did not come close to matching the amount of
senior postpetition interest that had accrued.24 ' As a result, accruing
senior interest squeezed out the junior secured parties from the collat-
eral. In 1943, the plan gave the junior secured parties only 10% of
principal.242
This 90% loss of principal is not the whole story. The railroad
proposed a nearly all-equity plan. It paid off some of the senior debt,
but mostly gave other senior creditors enough stock in the railroad to
equal the value of principal and postpetition interest. The junior
secured parties received stock in amounts that equalled about 10% of
principal. The railroad had more than enough cash in the bank to
meet working capital needs. Therefore, money that could have been
given to the juniors to compensate them for lost principal instead was
split with the fully compensated seniors.243
In railroad reorganizations at the time, creditors voted on the
plan, but the court could approve a plan over the unreasonable dissent
of creditors. The junior secured parties, not surprisingly, voted
against the plan. In addition to the stock they had received, they
wanted the railroad to hand over cash beyond what was needed as
working capital. They also thought that, to the extent senior secured
parties were paid, the disencumbered collateral should work to
increase the collateral claimed by the juniors.
The Supreme Court ruled that it was very unreasonable of the
juniors to object. 244 The extra cash and unencumbered collateral were
part of the firm assets that justified the allocation of common shares in
the railroad. To give that cash or collateral to the juniors would have
preferred one class of shareholders over another and would have
affected adversely the value of the stock by which the seniors received
full compensation. 245 No sympathy was given for the fact that the
junior secured parties suffered a 90% erosion of their position during
the pendency of the reorganization proceeding. Under the Bank-
241. Id. at 38.
242. 328 U.S. at 514-15.
243. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit thought this was unfair.
Denver, 150 F.2d at 35. The Supreme Court, however, correctly pointed out that the
entitlement to excess war profits was an element of the value of the common shares. 328 U.S.
at 518-19. If the railroad had to pay out that cash to junior secured parties, then the stock
would have to be valued downward. A downward valuation would have shifted more stock to
the seniors and away from the juniors. Therefore, whatever the juniors received in cash they
would lose in common shares.
244. Id. at 519-20.
245. Id. at 518-19.
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ruptcy Act, the junior secured parties were not entitled to protection
against squeeze-outs caused by senior secured claims accruing interest
after the bankruptcy petition, but before the plan was affirmed.24 6
In modern times, this precedent has been forgotten. Recent cases
have protected junior secured parties from accruing senior interest in
three ways. First, they have prevented the senior claim from growing
by ordering periodic payments of cash to the senior secured party.
24 7
Assuming no depreciation, these payments freeze the status quo. Sec-
ond, they have allowed the DIP to give the undersecured party extra
collateral to secure the amount of the squeeze-out. 248  Third, and
more remarkably, courts have ordered payments to the junior secured
party to compensate for the squeeze-out that occurs when senior
interest starts to accrue.249 It seems odd that the amount of postpeti-
tion interest due and owing the senior creditors was actually paid to
the junior creditors. Such a solution makes sense, but if all else is
equal, it seems the privilege of receiving cash (in lieu of noncash ade-
quate protection) ought to be offered to the senior secured parties
first, before it is offered to the juniors. Such an award is valuable
because it provides an opportunity for reinvestment by the recipient.
It should be noted that these cases do not necessarily award
undersecured parties postpetition interest in the manner disapproved
of by the Supreme Court in Timbers of Inwood Forest. There, the
Court held that adequate protection was to protect against erosion of
the collateral, not against erosion of the value of the security interest
246. One commentator reads this confusing case as saying just the opposite. Chicago
Comment, supra note 27. But this reading is based on a failure to grasp what is at stake. The
student author writes:
Junior bondholders were seeking to reject a plan because investments undertaken
out of current earnings during the trusteeship failed to add to the total valuation
of the railroad, while interest on senior claims continued to run, so that the
amount of compensation for their claims and their participation in the
reorganized enterprise were thereby reduced. But they did not contend that the
liquidation value of their liens was impaired .... So Denver itself reaffirmed the
secured creditor's right to the full value of his lien and limited the role of the
public interest to justifying investments and maintenance expenditures not
impairing lien value.
Id. at 523-24 (footnote omitted). The author fails to see that continuing accrual of senior
interest is exactly what impairs the liquidation value of the junior lien. Hence, Denver stands
against the secured creditor's right to the full value of the lien (as it existed at the time of the
bankruptcy petition).
247. In re McKillips, 81 Bankr. 454, 459 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1987); Parker v. Concorde Ltd.
Partnership (In re Concorde Ltd. Partnership), 67 Bankr. 717, 724 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
248. Bramham v. Nevada First Thrift (In re Bramham), 38 Bankr. 459, 467 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1984).
249. Topeka Bank & Trust v. American Properties, Inc. (In re American Properties, Inc.),
8 Bankr. 68, 71 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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due to the delayed collection of proceeds.250 From the viewpoint of
the junior secured party, senior interest clearly erodes the collateral.
VII. CONCLUSION: IS A RULE AGAINST POSTPETITION
INTEREST EVEN POSSIBLE?
The purpose of this article was to show that postpetition interest
entitlements and adequate protection do not exist in an instrumental
relationship. In other words, one cannot argue for a view of postpeti-
tion interest because it is necessary for adequate protection, nor can
one argue for a view of adequate protection because it is necessary for
postpetition interest. Instead, postpetition interest entitlements must
rise and fall for ethical reasons separate from the adequate protection
doctrine. Once we have a consistent, deontological (noninstrumental)
position on postpetition interest, then and only then will it be possible
to develop a consistent adequate protection doctrine.
Yet, until the Supreme Court spoke with its usual authority on
the subject of postpetition interest, neither positive law nor ethical
theory demonstrated that the weight of argument rested on either side
of the question. To make matters worse, no single position on postpe-
tition interest can render the law consistent or coherent. Any argu-
ment based on equality simply produces inequalities elsewhere.
There is a further problem. It may be the case that a rule against
postpetition interest for undersecured parties is unattainable, given a
strategy suggested by Professor Lynn LoPucki. Under this strategy,
postpetition interest can always be attained if secured parties subdi-
vide the loan by agreement into a fully secured and a partly secured
portion. 251 The fully secured portion would have a sizable equity
cushion built into it, so that if the debtor files for bankruptcy, at least
that portion will obtain interest.252
To illustrate, suppose the collateral is worth $80, a secured
party's claim is worth $90, and the relevant interest rate is 10%. If
the rules provide postpetition interest for oversecured parties, but not
for undersecured parties, then such a secured party gets no interest.
Suppose that, in the security agreement, the single loan is subdivided
into two loans--one for $70 and one for $20. The $70 portion is over-
secured, so that, under Section 506(b), the secured party can obtain
250. 108 S. Ct. at 635.
251. See L. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS viii
(Supp. 1988).
252. This is under the view that Section 506(b) sets the equity cushion as the limit of the
interest a secured party can collect. Also, note that 10% interest on $70 does not fully
compensate the secured party, who bargained for 10% on $90. But it is better than nothing.
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interest for over one year after bankruptcy. By dividing the loan into
two parts, the secured party obtains the right to postpetition
interest.2"3
Courts could counter with a rule that pierces the veil and pro-
claims the two loans to be in reality one. But this may not defeat
resourceful creditors. Loans could be made "genuinely separate"
from one another by adding attributes to each loan that make them
seem more and more different. For example, each loan could be made
by a different corporate subsidiary, or lenders could sell participations
in such a way that they amount to partial assignments of the claim.
In short, it may be the case that a rule against postpetition inter-
est for undersecured parties must be ineffective, so long as over-
secured parties remain entitled to postpetition interest. Thus a rule
against postpetition interest simply puts a premium on vacuous legal
expertise to derive the form that defeats the rule. If this is the case,
then perhaps the rule is not worth the trouble.
253. This exact strategy of subdividing the loan into an unsecured and an oversecured part
was present in Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Ladycliff College (In re Ladycliff College), 56
Bankr. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The court managed to defeat it, but on most unconvincing and
eventually useless grounds.
In Ladycliff College, the mortgage agreement provided that the debtor's real estate was:
to secure the payment of a portion of a total indebtedness of $370,000 to the
Mortgagee to the extent of [$150,000], together with interest thereon, which is
payable according to the terms of a certain note in the amount of $370,000.
Id. at 766. In this case, the land was worth in excess of $150,000. Id. at 767 n.2. Therefore,
the secured party seemed to be limiting itself to $150,000 in security, plus security for any
interest on the $150,000.
The secured party took the position that it was entitled to postpetition interest beyond
$150,000, to the extent of the collateral. The court, however, disagreed. It read Section 506(b)
as bidding it to compare the property available to the secured party against the amount of debt
secured by such property. Under this interpretation, there was no equity cushion, and hence
the secured party was not entitled to postpetition interest. Id. at 768 ("By definition, Marine
cannot be oversecured since the amount of the property to be weighed in the balance is neces-
sarily exactly the same as the secured claim.").
In fact, the refutation of the scheme is self-defeating. With regard to oversecured parties,
the property available to the secured party is always precisely equal to the secured party's debt.
For example, in a standard mortagage agreement whereby the secured party lends $150,000 on
land worth $250,000, the secured party has an interest in land worth $150,000-the rest is
debtor equity. On the court's argument, the secured party is undersecured-an absurdity that
reads Section 506(b) out of the Bankruptcy Code.
Furthermore, as I read the relevant language from the mortgage agreement, it specifically
reserved the value of the land above $150,000 for accruing interest. That is, the agreement
itself contemplates that the real estate above $150,000 should be reserved for interest. The
court ignores this provision, however.
Even if the court were remotely persuasive, the decision can be easily avoided. Instead of
trying to have a single loan agreement govern two loans--one secured and one unsecured-the
lender can easily give two loans at two separate times. In such a case, a court would have to
concede that some postpetition interest must be awarded to a secured party who, in the aggre-
gate, is undersecured.
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APPENDIX
This Article criticizes an economic claim that unless under-
secured parties receive postpetition interest, management, as trustees
in Chapter 11 for general creditors, has an incentive to reorganize a
firm even though liquidation maximizes firm value more effectively.
This incentive, it is alleged, derives from the fact that undersecured
creditors are subsidizing the cost of production through forced inter-
est-free loans.
Instead, this Article claims that, to the extent incentives are cre-
ated, the incentives have to do with how quickly management decides
to choose between liquidating and reorganizing. These incentives are
explored in a mathematical model.
A. The Case of Management Wishing to Maximize General
Creditor Claims
In the first part of the model, we assume that the DIP manage-
ment imposes no agency costs on general creditors and genuinely pur-
sues general creditor welfare. This claim is unrealistic in the extreme,
but, unless we make it, the mathematical model cannot work, and a
lot of numerate erudition will be down the drain. Although it may
seem reprehensible to engage in such fanciful assumptions of human
behavior just to make a mathematical model work, please be advised
that microeconomic modelling routinely indulges in highly stylized
notions of economic self-interest. For example, economic actors max-
imize their satisfaction by buying the cheapest commodity available,
but they never steal the commodity. Shareholders signal dissatisfac-
tion with management by selling their shares, but they never threaten
to kill the manager's children if agency costs are imposed on share-
holders. The assumption I am making here-that bankruptcy trust-
ees take their fiduciary duty seriously-is on the same order as these
common assumptions. Therefore, my model is just as valid as the
usual microeconomic demonstration, which admittedly is not saying
much. Some definitions:
V = firm value
Vu = firm value availabe to general creditors if undersecured creditors
are present
Vo = firm value availabe to general creditors if no undersecured credi-
tors are present
R = expected firm revenue per year
C = relevant costs of production necessary to produce the income
254
r = discount rate
254. These costs are more or less marginal in that the producer faces the issue of whether to
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Since we are studying the incentives for extending the period
after bankruptcy, but before a final decision between liquidation and
reorganization need be made, we assume R > C. If R < C, no DIP
(motivated solely by general creditor welfare) would engage in a strat-
egy of judicial delay.




Since all good things must come to an end, we cannot have such a
simple, perpetual formulation. Instead, we need something more
sophisticated. Some new definitions:
t = a variable time period exponent
y = number of years a firm expects it can delay before choosing
e = 2.71828, or one dollar continuously compounded at 100%
interest for one year255
We now examine V for a firm that desires to maximize the value of
general creditors by filing for bankruptcy and delaying a choice
between liquidation and reorganization. The value of the cash flow
during bankruptcy can be described as:
produce. In any case, they exclude any purely fixed costs. I am trying to capture a sense of
economic rents in the expression R - C.
255. A. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 289 (2d ed.
1974). The use of e implies continuously compound interest rates, an unrealistic assumption,
but it greatly simplifies any notation that involves taking derivatives and integrals. The
coefficient R or C allows us to use a principal amount other than one dollar. The exponent r
(market rate of interest) allows us to vary the rate from 100% to more commonly encountered
rates. And the exponent t allows us to vary from one year to any period we choose.
The model assumes that postpetition interest is paid out in cash, so that the secured party
can reinvest and earn compound interest. If, instead, interest is allowed to accrue against
existing or added collateral, compound interest would not be allowed. Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
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foYRe-tdt = RfoYe-rdt =
y t=y
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As for the costs of production (a negative cash flow), we can express it
by substituting C for R:
C(1 - e-)
r
It should be emphasized that the costs of production (C) include
interest only on prospectively created debt. The variable C excludes
interest on prebankruptcy debt, which is represented by a different
expression. The model assumes that general creditors and under-
secured creditors may not receive postpetition interest on preban-
kruptcy debt. It assumes further that oversecured creditors are
entitled to full interest payments until the equity cushion runs out.
Although there is a respectable argument that the rate of this interest
ought to be the relevant market rate,25 6 at least one prestigious case
suggests that the bankruptcy trustee has the option of the lesser of
contract or market.257 Other authorities hold that the contract rate is
always appropriate.258 We assume in this model that the contract rate
is the appropriate choice.
More definitions:
a = oversecured party's contractual interest rate
256. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 111, at 1077.
257. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner
Indus., Inc.), 734 F.2d 426, 435 n.12 (9th Cir. 1984).
258. L. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 244
(1985).
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s = oversecured party's claim for principal and prepetition
interest
c = equity cushion
Under the rules of bankruptcy, the trustee owes the oversecured par-
ties as per year for c/as years. This negative cash flow has a present
value of
fo/asase-atdt = asfoc/e-atdt =
c/as t = c/as[1 ] as]




- ac/ - 1)
= s (1 - e - c/s)
s
This latter formulation represents the amount of postpetition interest
a DIP will have to pay oversecured creditors, under the current bank-
ruptcy rules. Of course, there might be numerous secured parties,
some of whom are oversecured and some of whom are undersecured.
Properly, we should write, for n different secured parties,
n si
ii l
For the sake of simplicity, let us treat secured creditors as if they are
homogenous. Note that when there is no equity cushion and there are
only undersecured creditors, c = 0, and
S
s- =0
In other words, postpetition interest expense equals zero in such a
case.
Firm value, V, also includes the present value of the firm after a
bankruptcy court terminates the delaying strategy. But let's ignore
this factor, since postplan or postliquidation values must award both
secured and unsecured creditors present value as of the date of the
plan or liquidation. This amount expands or contracts, of course, as
the trustee adjusts the expected period of y. Because we have left out
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the present value of income after y years, V represents the value of the
firm's net income only during the bankruptcy. Later, when we define
the alternative opportunities of secured parties (assuming no strategy
of delay is adopted), we likewise exclude the value of income to be
received after y years, so that the alternatives are comparable.
We can now express V, in the case involving undersecured credi-




In other words, the delay before a reorganization/liquidation decision
is expected to result in a time period during which at least some
undersecured creditors receive no postpetition interest. In such a
case, we can express V as follows:
V, = foyRe-'dt - foyCe-'dt - foc/ aseatdt
R(1 - cry)- Q(1 -e-rY) [s ]
V u" = - S
r /-
(1 - e- ) (R - C)
V u = r s V
rs/e
Note that, as y increases, V increases, or
aV.
=e -ry (R - C) > oay
The above is true for the case of y > c/as. If
c
as
then all secured creditors are oversecured for the entire period of fea-
sible judicial delay. No wealth transfers from secured creditors to
unsecured creditors are possible. In this case, the formula for postpe-
tition interest must be written as follows:
5
foYaseatdt = S - --
e ay
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Under these conditions:
(1- e-1)(R - C) S s
r eay
No longer is it clear that an increase in y increases V. V's derivative
becomes:
OXo r ] [as-- [e -ry(R--C)] - I ]
ay eay
In other words, V increases when
as
ery (R - C) >-
eay
Otherwise, it does not increase.25 9
V and V should be understood to represent the value of aggre-
gate general creditor claims. In other words, V,, and V represent the
amount of the firm that the general creditors will receive when the
firm is finally reorganized or liquidated.
It is now necessary to determine when a DIP, wishing to maxi-
mize the return for general creditors, will choose a strategy of judicial
delay. If the choice does not maximize total firm value in comparison
to an immediate liquidation, then the bankruptcy rules are not opti-
mal. For this we need a definition of immediate, piecemeal liquida-
tion value:
x = the time at which secured parties would receive cash proceeds
in a piecemeal liquidation.
L = the present value of the total bankrupt estate between x and y
years, including the senior entitlements of the secured
parties.26"
We can write the present value of the secured parties' right to cash
proceeds as follows:
259. V might increase whenever the debtor signs loan agreements that now have below-
market contract rates. See Bulow & Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 19 BELL J. ECON. 437
(1978). Such contracts can be "de-accelerated" under Section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code
and thereby preserved for the benefit of the general creditors.
260. L is limited to the time between x and y years to make L comparable to V.
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Since secured parties are senior for this amount, the position of the
general creditors under an immediate liquidation can be defined as:
L - s(e- - e- r )
When undersecured creditors exist, this expression should be com-
pared by the DIP to the present value of the general creditors interest
under a delaying strategy:
(1 -e-)(R-C) 
Vu~~~ ----vu = [sI4]r SV c
In other words, for a strategy of delay (in lieu of immediate liquida-
tion or even immediate reorganization) to pay general creditors, it
must be true that:
(1- e- )(R -C) s ]
-- [s s]> L - s(e - - er y)
r I SV/-c




-then the following is the condition for a strategy of bankruptcy
delay:
(1 - e -')(R- C) -[ s L ]x~ Y
s > L-s](e-r - ery)r e ay I
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In other words, the delaying strategy yields greater gains to general
creditors when undersecured creditors exist. It is much less effective
when all creditors have adequate collateral cushions to cover postpeti-
tion interest during y years.
It is possible to imagine an optimal rule for the above formulas.
The first reform should guarantee all secured parties their postpetition
interest entitlements, so that we can substitute y for c/as. Second, we
should require that the rate of interest be the market rate, r, instead of
the contract rate, s. And third, the postpetition interest entitlements
of secured parties should commence, not when the petition is filed,
indicated by t = 0 in the above formulas, but at x, the time when a
secured party could expect to receive cash proceeds from an immedi-
ate liquidation. With these substitutions, instead of
5
foc/Sase-dt = s -
we could write
f-Yrse-'dt = rsfe-'dt =
y t=y
= rs -- 7 e- ] = -- r ]-
x t=x
-- rs
__ (e-y _ e-rx)
r
- s(e - rx - ery)
This expression now describes the optimal entitlement to postpetition
interest. Substituting it for our suboptimal expression, we find that
the conditions for a profitable strategy of bankruptcy delay become:
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(1 - e - )(R - C) - s(e -  - e- ') > L - s(e -  - e- y)
r
or, simplifying,
(1 -e-) (R - C)
> L
r
Now we see that, under the suggested optimal rule, the DIP's incen-
tive to delay the decision between reorganization and liquidation
occurs only when the firm's going concern value exceeds the firm's
immediate liquidation value. This formula guarantees that bank-
ruptcy delay is not desirable for the reason that it allows for wealth
transfers from secured to unsecured creditors. Instead, it guarantees
that DIPs will engage in Chapter 11 filings only under conditions in
which the expected result exceeds the value of an immediate
liquidation.
B. Agency Costs
It is widely suspected that bankruptcy trustees are not motivated
solely by altruistic concerns, but might in fact try to maximize their
own welfare. In such a case, judicial delay will occur, even if
R <C
in which C includes the administrative expense of keeping the bank-
ruptcy proceeding alive.
Although the same formulation of V will hold, as before, it is no
longer possible to claim that the conditions for a strategy of delay are
(1 - e - )(R - C) s
r -Es] > L - s(e-r - e- Y)
r " $/-e
Self-regarding DIP management is just as apt to engage in delay when
the opposite condition holds.
Assuming that DIP management is not able to expropriate value
from the secured creditors,261 the outward limit of managerial expro-
priations of general creditor entitlements might be something less
than
L - s(e - rx - e - 'y)
261. Not even this is a good assumption. For example, management could embezzle cash
collateral and could steal noncash collateral. Although criminal penalties exist, they do not
always deter such behavior.
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an amount that can be described as the DIP's unencumbered liquid
assets. It might also constitute something more than
L - s(e - rx - e- 'y)
because there could still be a positive value to
( - e- Y) (R - C ) S s ]
r I S V/e]r s/
For these reasons, it is too difficult to factor in a mathematical
description of the incentives that management of a DIP possesses to
maximize its own position.
A few observations are possible. First, while reputation factors
and the stock market act to minimize agency costs with nonbank-
ruptcy firms, such factors are not available for DIPs. In many cases,
DIPs have substantial monopsony power over the providers of mana-
gerial services. In other words, management, having driven the DIP
into bankruptcy, might have only a few attractive alternative employ-
ment opportunities. If arms length bargaining is the rule, this monop-
sony power ordinarily might lead to lower management salaries, but
quite the opposite is true in Chapter 11. The "next best opportunity"
of management represents a touchstone by which the incentives of
management milk the DIP. This opportunity is frequently a function
of reputation. If so, as this opportunity sinks in value, the less reputa-
tion matters, and the greater the incentive will be to take what can be
received from the DIP. If the next best opportunity is comparatively
attractive, reputation factors could be expected to temper the judg-
ment of DIP management.
A second observation is that old fashioned judicial vigilance is
needed to counteract this incentive, in order to make the performance
of management more in line with the fiduciary ideal. The model
presented above depends on the success of such endeavors.
C. Implications of the Model
The optimal reforms suggested above are empirically weak. In
fact, each involves unverifiable propositions-"but for" the automatic
stay in bankruptcy, how long would it take to liquidate collateral, the
variable x? Statements like this cannot be verified in the laboratory.
In addition, the optimal reforms depend entirely on the altruistic
instincts of DIP management. In other words, the optimal reform is
designed to address the problem of a DIP seeking to maximize gen-
eral creditor welfare, even at the expense of secured creditor welfare.
When DIP management fails to be altruistic and is self-interested, the
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reforms are useless, or at least not optimal. Incidentally, if it is
acceptable to assume that fiduciary standards are effective in inducing
altruistic behavior, the easiest reform of all is simply to rewrite the
standard and to require DIP management to maximize firm value or
national welfare, rather than general creditor welfare.
Even if we can base a set of optimal bankruptcy rules on the
altruistic behavior of DIP management, it is still true that postpetition
interest entitlements produce short term, rather than long term,
incentives.262 We have seen that postpetition interest does not affect
the choice between a Chapter 11 plan and a liquidation. Rather, it
affects the choice between immediate liquidation and an extended pro-
ceeding, during which an eventual decision between liquidation and
reorganization will be made. Given that disincentives are short term,
there is no compelling need to "mimic the market" by providing
secured creditors with their opportunity costs. Judicial vigilance
could be used so that Chapter 11 reorganizations proceed apace. We
have also seen that judicial vigilance is already mandated by the need
to assure that fiduciaries do not act in a self-serving manner. There-
fore, judicial vigilance to shorten the period of delay for the benefit of
undersecured creditors promises to achieve economies of scale. The
tools for judicial vigilance are already built into the Bankruptcy Code.
For example, the DIP loses the exclusive right to propose a reorgani-
zation plan within 120 days.263 Further extensions of time are subject
to judicial control,261 and any interested party can demand that the
Chapter 11 proceeding be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.2 65
One thing that the model does suggest is that, when a DIP truly
maximizes general creditor welfare, court vigilance should become a
function of the size of collateral cushions. In other words, when few
secured creditors are undersecured, a court can relax vigilance
because the DIP has somewhat less incentive to maximize delay until
the choice between reorganization or liquidation is made. When the
proceeding includes a large number of undersecured creditors, how-
262. Data on the time it takes to present a plan are presented in LoPucki, The Debtor in
Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 247, 269-70 (1983). The average delay of this study of Missouri cases was a little over 10
months. Id. at 269. LoPucki concluded that the 120 days granted by the Bankruptcy Code
had lengthened the delay over the previous Bankruptcy Act of 1898, in which the court was
permitted to fix the date by which the plan was to be proposed. Id. at 271.
263. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Grothuse v. P.A.G., Inc. (In re
Southwest Oil Co.), 84 Bankr. 448, 450-51 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1987) (refusing to extend time
of debtor exclusivity for submitting plan).
264. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
265. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see Mauna Lani Resort, Inc. v. Endrex Inv.
Inc. (In re Endrex Inv., Inc.), 84 Bankr. 207, 212 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988).
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ever, the court should be comparatively more insistent that the DIP
promptly decide the future of the firm.
In short, the arguments for adding a postpetition interest entitle-
ment have no good economic basis. There is no clear instrumental
purpose to such an entitlement that is not also served by an already
present judicial surveillance of bankruptcy proceedings. Any claim for
such entitlements must therefore rest on deontological grounds, not
on welfare economic arguments.
